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Introduction: Castlereagh and the Congress of Vienna
In the early morning of September 21, 1809, Robert Stewart Castlereagh and
George Canning traveled their separate ways to Lord Yarmouth’s cottage on Putney
Heath in England. They scheduled their rendezvous for 6 a.m. that morning; as such, they
were up before the dawn and on their way, pistols and shot in tow. While thoroughly
macabre, the fact that their shared mentor William Pitt had died within sight of the
cottage in January of 1806 made it a fitting location for their duel that morning. Stewart’s
cousin Yarmouth went with him, humming snippets from a contemporary piece of music,
Madame Angelica Catalani’s latest performance. They met with Canning and his second,
Charles Ellis, at the cottage. Stepping aside from their principals, Yarmouth and Ellis
made one final attempt at mediation between the two statesmen. Ellis stated that the
matter that Canning concealed had been on the command of the King and that Canning
himself had disliked the necessary deceit of Stewart; however, this equivocation did not
placate Stewarts wounded pride.1 While Castlereagh had fought a duel before in his
youth in Ireland, Canning had never fired a shot in his life. As the appointed time
approached, the men readied their pistols and took their marks. They both walked ten
paces and, then turned:
From April to October in 1805 the War of the Fifth Coalition waged across
Europe with Britain, Austria, and its allies fighting against the empire of Napoleon.2

1

Edward Cooke, Downing Street, To Charles Stewart, 21 September 1809, Castlereagh Papers,
MIC570/16 [D3030/Q3].
Thomas Moore to Miss Godfrey, 30 August 1807, in Memories, Journal and Correspondence of Thomas
Moore, edited and abridged from the first edition by the Right Hon. Lord Russel, MP (Longman: London,
1860), 69.
John Bew, Castlereagh: A Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 261.
2
While some authors specifically make reference to London, or English influence, this thesis will use the
phrase “British”. This is not to say that there was an absolute consensus between England and Scotland nor
to undermine the agency and conflict in portions of Ireland. "British" highlights that increasing view of
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While men died in Spain, Italy, and Germany, Castlereagh and Canning fought their duel
of public and private honor on a sward of grass in England. That two heirs of Pitt came to
such a row while the fate of Europe hung in the balance echoed the worst absurdities of
classical tragedy, hubris, and vainglory in the midst of war. It also showed the personal
nature of national and international politics. The flash of sword and roar of cannon
decided the fate of Europe’s wars, but the matters of peace rested on the individual
qualities of statesmen. While Castlereagh fought a duel of private honor in Putney Heath
and a war against Napoleon around Europe, his more important battle would take place
five years later at Vienna. It was there that he fought against his peers to establish a
lasting peace in Europe.
At the Congress of Vienna from September 1814 to June 1815, Stewart, the
second Marquees of Londonderry and Viscount Castlereagh, succeeded in encircling
France with a cordon of strong states that could better resist the possibility of future
French military aggression. He conceived these goals with an eye towards European
balance of power, strategically resettling European borders and placating allies when
necessary. He guarded against the advances of France and Russia through the
strengthening of the Low Countries, resettlement of Norway from Denmark to Sweden,
the restructuring of a more resilient Italian Peninsula, and the division of Poland and
Saxony along the convoluted borders between Russia, Austria, and Prussia. Castlereagh,
of course, held ideological leanings, but his principle purpose was neither the
preservation of absolute monarchy or ancien regime, nor a more liberal sentiment for

statesmen in London that while they did have interests in their private holdings, there remained larger
interests in the British Isles and the burgeoning Empire.
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self-determination. His goal was to bring peace to Europe through strategic realism in the
peacemaking process.
After the defeat of Napoleon in 1814 and the victorious march of the Allied
Coalition into Paris, the Great Powers faced the difficult position of restoring a shattered
and weary Europe. Great Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and wayward France met at
Vienna to discuss the fate of Europe and the resettlement of national borders. Due to his
familiarity with continental diplomatic figures from his time in the War Department and
Foreign Office, the British government sent Castlereagh. He had previously helped
arrange and execute multiple coalitions arrayed against Napoleon, built Britain’s army up
to an unprecedented size, and worked closely with Sir Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of
Wellington, in his Peninsular Campaign. Outside of continental Europe, Castlereagh
crushed an uprising in Ireland, led a secondary war against the United States, and helped
bring about the end of the Atlantic Slave Trade. Rather from these triumphs,
Castlereagh’s fame springs from his exploits at the Congress of Vienna and the part he
played in a peace settlement that directed the nature of European power politics for the
next century. In the ‘Long Century” of peace that followed, much of the criticism of
Castlereagh came from the British public itself, who thought his conservativism made
him subservient to foreign autocracy. After the apparent failure of the Concert of Europe3
in the Great War, popular British perception of Castlereagh as an arch-conservative
spread abroad as disenchanted Europeans heaped criticism upon him and his
Congressional peers.4

3

The Concert of Europe was another term for the Congress system that sprung from the Congress of
Vienna. The term and conception of the Concert, an idea that the states of Europe acted together, lasted
long after the Great Powers stopped meeting in Congresses.
4
Bew, XXVII-XXX.
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While his balance of power goals at Vienna were a success, Castlereagh did not
embrace the conservative ideology of his diplomatic peers; he instead sought European
security. He disapproved of the Holy Alliance and the Troppau Protocol that drew
Austria, Prussia, and Russia into an ever closer union. Still, his balance of power system
did not fail in the midst of the widening ideological gap between Britain and the
Continent. The Concert endured in some capacity through the revolts in Spain, Latin
America, and Ottoman Greece, as well as through the European Revolutions of 1848. The
Crimean War eventually shattered the general peace between the Great Powers. This
breakdown in European peace does not shear Castlereagh of his success in surrounding
France with military and diplomatic barriers succeeded long after the members of the
Coalition had gone their separate ways. Rather, his goal was to achieve a peace in
Europe—as long as he could—through the realistic checking of France and balancing of
other Powers’ interests.
The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars
The outbreak of the French Revolution caught most of the states of Europe by
surprise. While there had been contests in Europe between the rights of the aristocracy
and the monarchy, the attack on the Bastille and the seizure of the royal family were a
different sort of event altogether. The Revolution was not just an uprising by peasants
upset with the temporary disruption of their rights or a mob of the hungry; the ideological
origins of the French Revolution were the tenants of humanism and liberalism
brandishing teeth. However, Prussia and Austria took to the field to aggrandize their
interests and prestige. While figures in Britain were concerned with the disorder and
conflict, they did not take military action until Revolutionary seizure of the Low
David Gates, The Napoleonic Wars, 1803-1815 ( New York: Arnold, 1997), 171-196.
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Countries. France achieved mixed success with the mass conscriptions of men and
material via the levee en masse, but they failed to make deep inroads across the Rhine
into Germany. The rise and exploits of the young Corsican general Napoleon Bonaparte
in Northern Italy drastically changed the nature of the conflict, as did his further victories
for the French republic.5
While Napoleon won renown for invading Italy, Egypt, and Germany, his most
resounding successes were the war he waged against his own people, his seizure of the
throne as Emperor in December 1804, his fashioning of a proto-police state, and the
power he wielded over Europe at the expense of his subjects. In the following decade,
several different coalitions of Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia led by William Pitt or
Castlereagh contended against Napoleon. Though these were valiant efforts, they often
failed due to an inability of the Allies to bring concerted military forces to bear against
Napoleon, the inconstancy of the Allies, and the economic difficulty in financing the
wars. The First Coalition began in 1792 when Prussia joined Austria, who was already at
war with Revolutionary France. France suffered multiple invasions and an occupation of
Toulon by Britain. The Coalition ended with the ceding of the Austrian Netherlands to
France and Napoleon's victory in Northern Italy. Britain alone remained in conflict with
France through 1797.

5

Georges Lefebvre, The Coming of the French Revolution / by Georges Lefebvre; Translated and with a
Preface by R.R. Palmer (Princeton, N.J; Princeton University Press, 2005), 1-3. 49-72, 93-107, 183-189,
207-218.
Frank A. Kafker and James Michael Laux, The French Revolution: Conflicting Interpretations (New York:
Random House, 1968), 1-56.
William Farr Church, The Influence of the Enlightenment on the French Revolution, 2d ed. Problems in
European Civilization (Lexington, Mass; D. C. Heath, 1973), 183-194.
Bailey Stone, The Genesis of the French Revolution: A Global-Historical Interpretation (Cambridge
England; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 196-235.
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The Second Coalition, formed in 1799, traded Prussian soldiers for Russian. Both
Russia and Austria both raised arms for conflict in Germany and Italy, while Napoleon
returned from his exploits in Egypt. Although the coalition enjoyed some victories, it fell
apart in 1802 when Russia left due to disagreements with Britain over Russian nautical
privileges. Britain, Austria, and Russia dominated the Third Coalition in the conflict that
broke out the following year. From 1803-1805, Britain stood under the constant threat of
invasion. It was only after the battle of Trafalgar in October 1805 that Britain eliminated
any threat of French troops crossing the Channel. On the Continent, things went poorly
for the coalition as Napoleon performed a massive sweeping maneuver that caught an
Austrian army by surprise. Napoleon followed up with his greatest success, the battle of
Austerlitz, in which he defeated a combined Russo-Austrian force under the personal
command of Tsar Alexander. Napoleon also used this time to set up the Confederacy of
the Rhine as his own satellites in the former Holy Roman Empire.6
The Fourth Coalition, occurring from 1806-1807, was made of Prussian, Russian
and British forces. Prussia joined the coalition in fear of Napoleon’s growing influence in
Central Germany and then massed its forces in Saxony. Napoleon crushed Prussia in a
lightning campaigns and eventually wore Russia down in a series of clashes. Through
these successes, Napoleon annexed huge swathes of Prussian territory and forced Russia
into the Continental System to choke Britain of its European trade. The Fifth Coalition
began in 1809, pitting Austria and Britain against France. Austria contended with France
in Central Europe while Britain increased pressure on France in Spain through the
Peninsular Campaign led by Arthur Wellesley. Britain suffered failure in the Walcheren
Expedition, and Austrian forces suffered defeated at the hands of France at the battle of
6

Gates, 15-37, 49-82,196-264.
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Wargram. A significant amount of Austrian territory was transferred to strengthen France
and its allies.
The final coalition included Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia. The fruit of
Castlereagh’s diplomatic skill, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, and several of the smaller
German states, marched with them. This coalition became possible after Napoleon’s
failed invasion of Russia to compel maintenance of the blockade of British goods.
Military defeat and a long retreat from Moscow destroyed the most experienced members
of Napoleon’s armies, allowed Austria to disentangle itself from a forced alliance, and
prompted nationalist sentiment against Napoleon all over Europe. The defining battle of
the campaign was the Battle of Leipzig, the largest battle in European history before the
Great War. Napoleon was defeated, and he fought a rearguard action until his eventual
abdication after the Allies took Paris.7
The Congress of Vienna did not suddenly spring out of the diplomatic ether after
the defeat of Napoleon; it appeared organically through military and diplomatic necessity.
Castlereagh’s initial mission to the Continent was to use seized colonial possessions to
secure Belgium from French military control and influence and consolidate an Alliance
that would endure after the defeat of Napoleon.8 The Treaty of Chaumont was the first
step towards the Congress of Vienna. At Chaumont, Castlereagh said,
My own impression is, as it has always been, that whilst anything of an army
remains to him [Napoleon] will not easily submit to sign such a peace as the
Allies require; and I am induced to believe he will put his main resistance upon
Antwerp, 1st, as the point of most pride as well as power, and, 2ndly, as that

7

Ibid., 100-141.
Charles K. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815, Britain and the Reconstruction of
Europe (London: G. Bell and sons, ltd. 1931), 192-195.
Memorandum of Cabinet, December, 26th, 1813 from Charles K. Webster, British Diplomacy, 1813-1815
(London: G. Bell and sons ltd. 1921), 123-126.
8
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interest in support of which he expects the continental Powers will be least
disposed to continue the war.9
Their successes or failures aside, the other coalitions up to this point were limited in
scope. The defeat of Napoleon, while a lofty goal for a coalition, was only a part of the
Treaty of Chaumont. The purpose of the Treaty was to bind Britain, Russia, Austria, and
Prussia together beyond the defeat of Napoleon. For the present war, each Power
provided 150,000 men or comparable subsidies, but the longer plans of the Quadruple
Alliance remained for twenty years and guaranteed each of the signatories’ security
against France with a compulsory force of 60,000 soldiers.10 This alliance was a sword
set against France, but one of Castlereagh’s goals was to make the drawing of this blade
unnecessary.
Initial attempts at settlement among the Great Powers at Paris failed due to the
patriotic fervor of the French people, the distracting decadence of the city, and the
intemperate boasts of Tsar Alexander. An example of this lack of circumspection by
Alexander was his unilateral decision to settle Napoleon Bonaparte on the Island of Elba
with his honors intact. A second attempt to settle matters in London also failed when
Alexander alienated the Prince Regent and much of Parliament. The settlement moved to
the secondary cultural center of Europe, Vienna. The home of the ancient Hapsburg
Monarchy, Vienna made sense as an appropriate site for deliberation. The Allies
eventually formalized their monopoly on the deliberation of the proceedings by keeping
all territorial distribution decisions unto themselves, but also sought the support of France
and Spain. Smaller states that sent representatives to Vienna waited on the sidelines as

9

Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 3, 1814: B.D. 163; March 4, 1814: F.O. Continent, 3. from Webster, The
Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815, Britain and the Reconstruction of Europe, 227.
10
Ibid., 227.

11

the larger states determined their fates. While the operations of the large states kept the
smaller states of Europe from enjoying the fruits of sovereignty, it allowed the resolution
of larger settlements concerns.11
Talleyrand attempted to disrupt proceedings by appealing to a European wide
participation in the Congress, but his appeal only gave rise to the Committee of Eight and
a Special Committee of five German powers. The former was a lightning rod, a show that
the Congress had greater European legitimacy than the domination of Great Powers in the
proceedings allowed. It was this group, not the Committee of Four, that called for
hostilities against Napoleon in the Hundred Days.12 The latter Committee rose to the task
of drafting a constitution for a German Federation, though the Committee did suffer due
to initial animosity between Prussia and Austria, as well as similar relations between
smaller states like Wuttenburg and Bavaria.13
While some of Castlereagh’s contemporaries attributed his actions at the Congress
of Vienna to a desire to reinforce conservative ideological goals or personal pretensions
of continental prestige, this interpretation ignores his strategic goals at the Congress.14
Following the upheavals of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, Castlereagh
succeeded in surrounding France with states that could better resist French military
aggression. While he built up the Low Countries and Piedmont-Sardinia, he carefully
rearranged the borders of lesser Italian states, Norway, Poland, and Saxony. Castlereagh

11

Charles K. Webster, The Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815 (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1963), 79-88.
It was this seizure of authority that marked the full recognition of the “Great Powers” as states
fundamentally different from smaller European states.
12
Ibid., 95, 155.
13
Ibid., 84, 148-149.
14
Many of Castlereagh’s contemporaries and successors made such an accusation. For a particularly useful
source on the motivations of Castlereagh and a fuller context of his academic and diplomatic background,
see John Bew’s Castlereagh: A Life.
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held ideological presumptions, but his principle purpose was to bring peace to Europe by
focusing on diplomatic and strategic realities.
Difficulty With Sources
While Castlereagh has left behind many documents through the materials
arranged by his brother or the official communiqués, reports, and instructions from the
War Department, Foreign Office, and Parliament, there are significant gaps in the
sources. Castlereagh provided materials for his colleagues in the Netherlands, Italy,
London, Vienna, and Moscow. He meticulously preserved his notes during the Congress
itself from outside misuse. Prince Metternich’s spy service was in full force at Vienna,
and so Castlereagh often destroyed his documents, kept things under lock and key, and
used his own staff brought from England in lieu of compromised local staff at Vienna.
While there is access to some of his materials, a good deal of the scholarship on Vienna
relies on what Castlereagh planned before the Congress, what he said about it afterwards,
and his private communications with peers around Europe. While it would of course be
better to have Castlereagh’s notes from the Congress as the proceedings occurred, it is
possible to put together his views on balance of power and settlement from other sources.
The principle primary sources of Castlereagh are the collections from the Foreign
Office, the Castlereagh Papers, and The Correspondence, Despatches, and Other Papers
of Viscount Castlereagh put together by his younger brother Charles William Vane.
These sources are in no way exhaustive of the political culture of Europe, of Britain, or of
Castlereagh himself, but they serve as an excellent framework to introduce the researcher
to Castlereagh’s policies for peace in Europe.15

15

Enno Kraehe wisely pointed out the limited usefulness of a paper on the Congress and larger European
diplomacy that does not use all the diplomatic sources available. For the limited scope of this work
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Chapter One
The Historiography of the Congress of Vienna
The Congress of Vienna has long been of importance to historians and statesmen
as a guiding star of diplomatic communication or a warning on the dangers of an
aggrandizing peace. Three authors stand out as particularly influential in the diplomatic
historiography of Castlereagh. Charles Webster, Harold Temperley, and Henry Kissinger
all wrote on the diplomatic goals of Castlereagh at Vienna. While their works set the pace
for all future discussions of Castlereagh’s diplomacy, they are not without omissions or
faults. While Webster and Temperley wrote between the First World War and the end of
the Second, the continued attempts at balance of power during the Cold War influenced
Kissinger’s A World Restored. Kissinger’s work grappled with balance of power issues,
but Edward Guilick, Harold Nicolson, and Paul Schroeder further pursued the topic of the
Congress and Castlereagh’s policy for peacemaking, but they often failed to grasp the
vision of their predecessors or fully address the nature of the diplomats at the Congress—
their education, ideology, and goals. While Gulick, Nicolson, and Schroeder wrote during
the Cold War, and their writings do reflect that background, the fall of the Berlin Wall
and the collapse of the Soviet Union coincided with another trend in historical research.
By the 1990s, the growing popularity of social history and a move a more
nuanced form of biography took the academic and the general reader into the mind of the
statesmen at Vienna—Castlereagh not the least. David King pursued a detailed history of
the decadence of the Congress, and Adam Zamoyski made the first great move to the
popular political account of the Congress of Vienna. While King’s work suffered from

however, more particular sources and research were used with Castlereagh as the object and not as a
diplomatic coincidental.
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flippancy about diplomatic affairs, and the issue of Polish nationalism stilts Zamoysky’s
work, both succeed in moving Castlereagh from the sole province of diplomatic
historians and statesmen to the attention of the general reading public. John Bew’s recent
biography made use of a firm understanding of European ideology, diplomatic realism,
and Castlereagh’s background to paint a full picture of Castlereagh’s diplomatic and
personal motivations—culminating with the diplomatic realism and popular historical
approach of his predecessors. In spite of several excellent texts, many historians disregard
details on Castlereagh’s approach to nationalism and his general ideology. Castlereagh’s
legacy from the Congress of Vienna is undoubtedly complex, but a clear understanding of
the diplomatic background in which he labored and his own internal struggles are
necessary context to understand his realistic goals at the Vienna peace settlement.
The three most important authors on Castlereagh’s diplomatic history are Charles
Webster, Harold Temperley, and Henry Kissinger. Webster and Temperley share an
academic and professional background in interwar England, while Kissinger was an
academic and statesmen of a singularly different nature. Webster and Temperley wrote
several books on the diplomacy of Britain, which involved Castlereagh, but their own
fears and concerns of interwar Europe had some influence on their work. Instead of the
prosecution of the war against Napoleon, both men spent a great deal more time
discussing the efforts for achieving and maintaining peace. Webster wrote several books
on the Congress of Vienna and Castlereagh, but the most important works were his short
texts on the bureaucratic structure of the Congress, The Congress of Vienna, and a pair of
books on Castlereagh’s foreign policy from 1813-1822.16 The former covers the
16

Webster, The Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815.
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motivations of diplomats and the exchanges of territories, but the primary purpose of the
text demonstrates the organization of the Congress. It did not just jump into the minds of
the creators ex nihilo; it was a thoroughly organic process amongst the Great Powers. The
structures of power and the diplomatic representation at the Congress changed with the
movements against an enthroned Napoleon, the early fears over territorial settlements,
and the pretensions of states and statesmen. His other two works, The Foreign Policy of
Castlereagh 1812-1815 and The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822, were the
fruit of his desire to gain a clearer understanding of the Congress System in Europe and
what role Britain’s foreign policy played in its formation and maintenance.17 While the
nature of international diplomacy and economics meant that Britain remained in contact
with the Continent in the remainder of the 19th century, Webster believed that the
connection between the common problems of Europe and Britain were closest at the
close of the Napoleonic Wars.18 In regards to Castlereagh, Webster broke down his
actions into two parts: the personal factors and changes in diplomacy that made the last
great coalition possible, and Castlereagh's key role in the peace settlement.
Webster’s colleague in 19th century British diplomacy, Harold Temperley had a
rather different appraisal of the Congress of Vienna, Castlereagh, and the effects and
significance of the Congress System.19 The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827 only
briefly focuses on Castlereagh, but it was an important addition in the historiography of

17

Charles K. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822 (London: G. Bell and sons, ltd.
1925), v.
Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815, Britain and the Reconstruction of Europe.
18
Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822, vii.
19
The academic adversity of Webster in Canning is stuff of legend. Their rows may have something to do
with their different backgrounds during World War II. Temperley served in the Foreign Office while
Webster served in the War Department, curiously paralleling the careers of their subjects Canning and
Castlereagh.
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Castlereagh and the Congress.20 Temperley was one of the first historians to offer
criticism of Castlereagh’s actions at the Congress and his reactions to the Holy Alliance
without attributing it to starch conservatism. He treats the success of the Quadruple
Alliance over Napoleon as their shining moment, a gilded accomplishment that tarnished
in the suppression of liberal European ideology and the ideological division between the
Allies.21 The seeds of the Allies’ failure were in how the different Powers looked at the
fulfillment of treaties and a disagreement on the purpose of the Quadruple Alliance.22 In
spite of Castlereagh’s disapproval of the suppression in Germany brought on by the
Carlsbad Resolutions, he stood aside and did not press the issue. While Prince Clemens
von Metternich desired a period of static peace, Castlereagh’s goal was a continuance of
the Congress System.23 Without the danger of France, the Great Powers were able to go
their own way on issues, and the discontent in British public opinion limited
Castlereagh’s diplomatic freedom.
The fact that Webster and Temperley disagree on the nature of Castlereagh and
Canning’s role at the Congress and larger European diplomacy is not particularly
troubling. How different the men were in temperament and method of policy in spite of
their similar backgrounds always attracts scholarly attention. Two things are sadly
lacking from Webster and Termperley’s works: they do not make a clear connection
between the private nature of individual statesmen and the larger political goals. Both
Webster and Temperley provide details and analyses of Castlereagh’s life and diplomatic
20

Harold William Vazeille Temperley, The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827; England, the Neo-Holy
Alliance and the New World (London: G. Bell and sons, ltd. 1925).
21
Ibid., 3-4.
22

Ibid., 4-5. The constant tension of Tsar Alexander’s desire for autocratic rule and the trappings of liberal
ideology were a constant source of diplomatic and political angst. Temperley asserts that the revolutions of
the 1820’s and his frustration with Poland ended this dichotomy.
23
Ibid., 8-9.

17

background, but they never make a clear connection between the events of his life and his
later policies. Castlereagh’s tumultuous introduction into Irish politics, his early trip to
Spa, and his service in the War Department and Foreign Office tempered his appraisal of
the destruction and disorder of European warfare. While the dates and data are present for
Webster and Temperley, they never draw the private man and his public policies to the
point of reconciliation.
The Great War tempered Webster’s and Temperley’s perspectives on the
Congress, but the end of World War II and the rumblings of the Cold War influenced
Henry Kissinger’s A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of
Peace 1812-1822, first published in 1954. While his topic was the peace settlement, his
own pressing interest in the uneasy détente between the United States and the Soviet
Union colors his work. This preoccupation is clearly seen in his discussion of inherent
obstacles between revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces. Their inability to
accept each other’s political, social, or ideological framework as valid bars them from
successful diplomatic discussions. They are unable to deal with particulars because of the
assumption that the universals that either side supports are a ruse for selfaggrandizement.24 More pressing is Kissinger’s discussion of Castlereagh’s goal to
construct a balance of forces in the Continent and Metternich’s goal to buttress this
equilibrium with enduring legitimacy.25 While Castlereagh looked to reduce France,
Metternich wished to use Russia as a long-term check on French power.26 In spite of
these different goals, both men walked a tightrope between their aspirations and either
24

Henry Kissinger, A World Restored; Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22,
Sentry Edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973).
Ibid., 1-4.
25
Ibid., 6.
26
Ibid., 60.
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creating a power vacuum in Western Europe or a Russian hegemony in Central Europe.
According to Kissinger, the issue of justice, of a state’s own conception of its role and
historical identity, limited the settlement of a lasting peace. Metternich and Castlereagh
were able to overrule these issues for Austria and Britain, to achieve a lasting peace at the
Congress of Vienna. Rather than cater only to the interests of their own states and then
appeal to a balance, both statesmen willingly limited their nations for a larger goal.27
Kissinger’s multiple parallels of the Cold War and the Congress of Vienna do not damage
his scholarship, but they do undermine something in his overall argument. While
Kissinger looked at the personalities and temperament of Castlereagh and Metternich, his
work comes across as a species of structuralism. Kissinger did not assert that
Castlereagh’s social background and economic concerns bound him in his policy making,
but he could not break free from a rigid need for a balance of power in Europe. It seems
that Kissinger saw a balance of power—with Austria at its center—as the only possible,
advantageous diplomatic option. It was possible, indeed sought after by most of his peers
in Britain, that Castlereagh would support a removal of Britain from the affairs of
Europe; however Castlereagh did not see this option as tenable. Castlereagh achieved
Britain’s immediate territorial concern for Hanover and the Low Countries at the Treaty
of Paris. He had no need to get involved in lengthy and expensive obligations in Vienna.
What he saw during his actions against Napoleon, the building of the last coalition, and
the signing of the Treaty of Chaumont was an intrinsic connection between British
interests and peace on the Continent. The goal of Castlereagh was not balance of power
for its own sake, but a pursuit of British interest as well as European peace.

27

Ibid., 145-147.
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Castlereagh and the Balance of Power
In order to understand the politics of Europe following the defeat of Napoleon and
the nature of the arguments at the Congress of Vienna, one must have a basic
understanding of the European states system and the nature of the Great Powers.28 The
ancien regime in Europe was a collection of various dynastic rulers, long-term landed
aristocrats, later merchant and administrative aristocrats, and various bureaucratic
officials. The ancien regime embraced a large array of political forms ranging from
liberal constitutional monarchies to conservative autocracies—and yet, they shared the
cultural touchstones of manners, blood ties, a Christian background of one form or
another, and a reverence for the classical Mediterranean empires.29 Out of the ever
shifting conflicts in Europe formed five relatively comparable Great Powers: Great
Britain with its burgeoning, far-flung economic empire; France with its historic desire for
military and cultural hegemony on the Continent; Austria with its ancient prestige at the
heart of its vast holdings spread throughout Europe; Russia as the rising player on the
field with Asiatic, Levantine, and European interests; and Prussia with its recent rise to
Great Power status due to the military expertise of Frederick the Great.30 States of all
sizes and makeup filled Europe, but these five states surpassed all the rest. Other
statesmen had proposed vast international coalitions and alliances—even William Pitt
pursued this goal in his own fashion—but Castlereagh was the one who made it possible
with his emphasis on concerted action, international guarantee, and his realistic
For the sake of convenience in this work, the term “nation” and “state” describes a specific geographic
region in which some governing body claims a monopoly on the use of force. Any allusion to the forces of
nationalism and self determination are due the vagaries of language unless otherwise stated.
29
Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power; a Case History of the Theory and Practice of
One of the Great Concepts of European Statecraft (Ithaca: Cornell University Press for the American
Historical Association, 1955), 10-11.
30
Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from
1500 to 2000, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Random House, 1987), xvii.
28

20

settlement at Vienna. It would take the closed nature of the Congress to make the
demarcation of Great Power official, but the turmoil of the French Revolution and
Napoleonic Wars served as a crucible to turn the Powers into the prime movers of
authority and policy on the Continent.31
Between the Great Powers and the European state system there was no invisible
hand of moving about states, but rather deliberate actions of rulers and statesmen in
response to a preponderance of power. Europe was not a self-correcting power system,
but it did tend to abhor hegemony. The size of the Great Powers, the existence of sections
of territory within Europe and abroad that could easily change hands, and the long history
of the governing dynasties encouraged the predatory system in which the Great Powers
fought, but it did not drive them to push one another into oblivion. Some early coalitions
formed to seize territory, but some came about due to fear of the Hapsburgs or France
creating a hegemonic power in Europe, the material realities of conquest, and a shared
background amongst the Great Powers.32 The Great Powers actively resisted any change
that would build a hegemonic state that could threaten their own sovereignty. Balance of
power was not an eternal peace—it was balance through constant conflict. Warfare was a
constant in the 300 years before the French Revolution due to the Great Powers’ need for
security, against their peers. Beneath this conflict was a desire for security and a need to
limit the rise of a hegemonic power, which doomed Europe to near perpetual warfare. It
would take the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire to change that.
Castlereagh’s early tutelage under William Pitt and the military support of Arthur
Wellesley were of the utmost importance to his understanding of balance of power issues.
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Kissinger wrote on the balance of power, but other authors pursued it in order to
focus more intently on specific issues in maintaining equilibrium between states. Some
pursued a limited view on particular issues—with mixed results—while other enriched
the field with broad studies that placed the actions of Castlereagh in a broader context.
Edward Gulick’s Europe’s Classical Balance of Power, published in 1955, deals with
misconceptions and realities of the European states’ approach to diplomacy and war.
Driven by what he saw as a lack of an overall synthesis in the field, he discusses balance
of power as a theory in thought and practice in the Europe state system, with the
Congress as a singular case study. He argues that European statesmen perceived of a
special European system that self-corrected for the rise of hegemonic forces. His
treatment of Castlereagh and the Congress of Vienna focuses on the idea of a reactionary
treaty, one that would serve to entrap later French aggression. This diplomatic trap would
serve to redress the potential homogony nearly achieved by Napoleonic France and set up
the framework to resist renewed campaigns by either France or Russia in Central
Europe.33
Gulick does make some excellent points about the nature of international
guarantee, but he ignores the reality of European statecraft. While there had been various
coalitions in European history against a rising power, the norm in European warfare was
a short-term military alliance that created a preponderance of power for the exploitation
of a neighbor. Coalitions were usually predatory, not defensive—which may seem to be a
minor point, but Castlereagh’s efforts at Vienna are only possible with a correct
understanding of this issue. If the natural inclination towards states is self-correcting,
Castlereagh was merely a political actor giving shape to an intrinsic diplomatic
33
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undercurrent—but if the norm of European diplomacy was conflict and exploitation, then
his actions in forming the Treaty of Chaumont to guard against France, his attempts to
pro-actively invest power in other states, and his attempts to forge a lasting peace are all
the more impressive. Guilick touches on some interesting ideas, but fails to grasp the
nature of the diplomatic system that Castlereagh and his peers worked in.34
If Gulick’s attempt at a minute study led him to error, Paul Schroeder’s The
Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848 succeeded admirably due to the
inclusiveness of its content and scope. Rather than the issue of balance of power at
Vienna itself, Schroeder approaches the failures of the old balance of power system
during the Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, and shows the development of equilibrium
in Europe based on comparable hegemony and underpinned by international law. 35 It was
not the French, Atlantic, Industrial, and Napoleonic Revolutions that had the greatest
influence on Europe, but the diplomatic revolution. Ideas and theories of government, not
the horrors of war, changed European political thought from raw and boundless selfaggrandizement to a tempered deferral of personal state goals for a larger European
good.36 Schroeder sets the wars against Napoleon in the proper context of predatory state
interests, but draws special attention to the Third Coalition. For Schroeder, the Coalition
kept together by Castlereagh was the turning point for Austria and Prussia. Their defeats,
reversals, and betrayals had taught them that the formation and success of an international
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alliance was difficult in the current European diplomatic system. It also failed to provide
security. Both Powers, still driven by self interest, began to recognize the need for a new
system or tenor for diplomatic relations in Europe.
The primary difference between the policies of the 18th and 19th centuries is that
the latter relied on the deferral of unbridled ambition and a basis of diplomacy on law,
legitimacy, and trust over temporary exploitation. While other authors might say that the
new generation of statesmen after the death of Castlereagh, Metternich, and Talleyrand
did not fear the destruction brought about by the Napoleonic Wars as their predecessors
did, Schroeder asserts that the principle error was a failure in maintaining the new
political system.37 Schroeder’s work has little time to discuss the personal politics of
Castlereagh at the Congress, but he does touch on a fundamental truth of the
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars: their destruction and upheaval was so disastrous as
to prompt a desire in Castlereagh to set aside unbridled British wealth, power, and
influence on the Continent to pursue that end. In the discussion of the events at Vienna,
the transformation in European politics was well underway. It would take Castlereagh’s
settlement and plan to guard against France to make it a reality.
Popular History of Castlereagh and Congress
The end of the Cold War and the movement of academia to other aspects of social
history brought out a renewed interest in the classic biography, as well as in the period
piece meant for a larger audience. While the former reconciled the individual with his
academic, economic, religious, and ideological surroundings, the latter ignited an interest
towards a larger audience. The introduction of Castlereagh and the Congress of Vienna
into popular nonfiction is surprising at first glance, but the upheaval and turmoil of the
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period and the personal nature of the conflict and negotiations lend themselves well to a
stirring narrative. This new perspective is the fruit of a renewed interest in social history,
as well as an attempt to make diplomacy approachable to the general public. The works
of David King, Adam Zamoyski, and John Bew are three recent entries in the popular
history of the Congress and Castlereagh.38
As an example, David King’s Vienna: 1814 focuses on the revels, dances, and
dalliances of the princes and statesmen at Vienna.39 King’s approach of laying out the
figures of the Congress as compelling characters with their own personal idiosyncrasies,
flaws, and strengths allows him to focus on some of the lesser individuals who took part,
such as Dorothee de Talleyrand Perigord.40 His focus on the pageantry, torrid affairs, and
social distraction of the Congress creates the image that events at the Congress were
petty. He describes borders and souls parceled out at the swish of a pen, but does not
establish the real fear among the different Powers and their willingness to go to war. The
conflict over territory and prestige was a game, but their function in maintaining peace
and seeking state self interest. King’s desire to focus on the material and social culture is
commendable, but he has failed the reader if the Congress is seen as silly as opposed to
how deadly earnest it was. King points out Castlereagh’s goal to build an “iron ring”
around France while undermining its importance or seriousness of that goal by focusing
on aristocratic minutia.41 In his coverage of the Holy Alliance, King says that Castlereagh
was comfortable with the new “general European police.” King also says that the
38

Bew and Zamoysky’s work deal with nationalism and ideology at the Congress as explained further
below.
39
David King, Vienna, 1814: How the Conquerors of Napoleon Made Love, War, and Peace at the
Congress of Vienna, 1st ed. (New York: Harmony Books, 2008).
When describing the book to a peer, the phrase, “the Downton Abbey of European politics” came up.
Ibid., 40-42.
41
Ibid., 150-151.
40

25

revolutions in Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Naples made the “Great Powers” declare that
they would not recognize revolutionary movements or settlements and would resist them
by force. Both of these statements are misleading because Britain, France, and Austria all
had differing opinions on recognition of revolutionary forces. King creates the false
image of unanimous, concerted reaction in Europe where none existed. In the rush for
greater public interest and coverage of social history, it is important not to slip into error.
The historiography of the Congress of Vienna and Castlereagh are a rich field that
has transformed between the scholarship during Great War and current historic and
literary trends. The telescoped political analysis of the interwar period gave way to
studies that attempted to uncover trends or transformative processes in politics. World
War II and the Cold War prompted a further desire in some political historians to provide
a response to the Marxist narrative of European politics based on the broader issues of the
early modern period. In spite of this new focus, historians kept returning to the Congress
of Vienna due to its place as a nexus of modern European history. The rise of greater
interest in social history and a widening audience for public history has brought an
innovative change. The background of political figures, the details of their lives while
conducting diplomacy, and the social context in which they worked are synthesized with
earlier writers who focused on high politics and sweeping diplomatic transformation.
Castlereagh and Nationalism at the Congress
While there have been several books that dealt with nationalist movements around
the time of the Congress of Vienna, some authors still tend to focus on the image of the
Great Powers running rough-shod over national interest. It is true that Webster took this
route, but Hannah Strauss expertly deals with the nationalist ideas circulating Vienna
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during the Congress in The Attitude of the Congress of Vienna Toward Nationalism in
Germany, Italy, and Poland. Works that continue to make an appeal to abjured
nationalism at the Congress come across as rather niche in focus. A recent example of
this trend was Adam Zamoyski’s The Rites of Peace. While it principally dealt with the
military defeat of Napoleon and the arranging of the coalition against him, Zamoyski
points out that the plans of the Allies while fighting Napoleon in the field were temporary
measures, plans to reflect the discourse in London or Vienna. Instead of reassessing the
necessity of their decisions, the Allies carried on with their established plans and policies.
Zamoyski’s discussion of the redrawing of borders is an interesting discussion that leaves
some confusion on where he stands on the pragmatism or justice of the settlement. While
he does assert that the Congress’ overall settlement supported the goals of the ancien
regime, he does not condemn them for pursing their own ends. Throughout his work,
Zamoyski is rather critical of most of the proceedings regarding Poland. Harold Nicolson
and David King also have passing remarks about the cavalier attitude of the Congress
towards the lesser states of Europe.
With some issues in the historiography of a subject, it is possible to make a brief
note and move on. The issue of nationalism and ideology at the Congress of Vienna are
integral to the understanding of the Congress and Castlereagh’s goals. Castlereagh and
the rest of the Congress did not ignore the possibility of nationalism, nor did they as a
body desire to impede it in all its forms. Castlereagh weighed the benefits of nationalism
against its intemperance and fragility, siding with order and some form of control by the
ancien regime on the Continent. This is not a tangential issue for the scholarship of
Castlereagh. It ties into how he viewed the settlement of Europe. If he abjured
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nationalism for reasons other than a natural inclination towards aristocracy, then it is
more likely that strategic concerns pushed him onward. The statesmen at Vienna did not
dismiss nationalism out of hand, but rather they addressed its benefits and dangers for
their own personal goals and the general peace of Europe. Castlereagh in particular
showed ideological flexibility in how he dealt with these issues. While he might make
use of nationalist sentiment, his underlying goal was always the preservation of peace in
Europe.
The issue of German nationalism at the end of the Napoleonic Wars split
through the sharp difference in opinion between the two largest German states, Prussia
and Austria. While figures in Prussia hoped to use German nationalism to further their
own ends, Austria saw the movement as a possible danger. German nationalism might
strengthen the solidarity of the German states, but it would also erode the cohesiveness of
the multi-ethic Hapsburg holdings. Castlereagh had freedom at Vienna, but his actions
towards German nationalism—and its effects on the government’s budget—had to appear
before Parliament. While the Tories willingly incorporated Saxony into Prussia and the
Whigs preferred to preserve it, neither group had a clear idea of the larger issues of the
settlement. No matter the response of Parliament, Castlereagh saw his own goals for
balance of power as solid and able to stand against the opposition.42 In spite of his
eventual acquiescence of Saxon territory, Castlereagh did remark that “if the
incorporation of the whole of Saxony into the Prussian monarchy is necessary to assure
the welfare of Europe, I would not condemn the measure from either the political or
moral point of view, though I feel some regret at the idea of seeing such an ancient family
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so profoundly injured.”43 His response to the settlement of Saxony and German
nationalism became less friendly as tensions increased between the Great Powers over the
settlement of Poland and Saxony. On his return to England, he expressed his new distrust
of German nationalism by stating that “public feeling, not merely the people of Germany,
but of all other countries, would have been wounded by so great and complete a sacrifice
of an ancient family.”44 For Castlereagh, Germany nationalism only became an issue after
it threatened to bolster Prussia and threaten the balance of power in Central Europe.
Regardless of larger diplomatic and strategic concerns, any talk of unifying the states of
Germany touched on the interest of Britain due to the holdings of House Hanover. For
Castlereagh, the issue of Hanover was “a point of honor, and a point of honor to this
country.”45 The Prince Regent shared this opinion, showing indifference to the loss of
territories to Hanover.
Britain’s interest in German nationalism was a non-issue in spite of the royal
connection to Hanover, but Austrian and Prussian interests bound up with the idea of a
German nation. Two of Castlereagh’s goals at the Congress of Vienna were the
strengthening of Prussia in northern Europe in order to serve as a physical buffer against
France in the German states, as well as the strengthening of Austria to block French
military incursions into Italy and diplomatic forays into the German states. The
historiography of the liberation of Germany and contest between Austria and Prussia for
the hearts and minds of the German Confederation is too large to discuss here.46 While
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both of these states had their own interests and goals, Castlereagh had a great deal of
diplomatic wiggle room at the Congress. There are those who lay the control of the
Congress System at the feet of Metternich—and rightly so—but the Congress System
was only possible because Castlereagh saw its value at Chaumont and pursued it with
vigor.
Castlereagh’s response to nationalism in Italy suffered complications by Joachim
Murat sitting on the throne of Naples and Britain’s earlier use of nationalism as a sword
against Napoleon. While Napoleon had covered himself in glory in his early campaigns
in northern Italy, the death knells of his empire prompted the rise of a muted nationalist
sentiment. His brother-in-law Murat was a man of great ambition, who considered uniting
Italy under his rule. Eugene Beauharnais, the viceroy of Italy, considered doing the same.
While the passions of these men could be seen as traditional dynastic desires under the
guise of a populist movement, the actions of British and Austrian commanders on the
ground introduced further difficulties. Austrian commanders Marshall Bellegarde and
General Nugent promised freedom from foreign oppression and called for national
independence. More embarrassing for Castlereagh at the later Congress were the proItalian declarations of Lord William Bentinck, the commander of Britain’s forces in Italy.
Bentinck was inconsistent in his support, also promising Genoa freedom as a separate
republic. 47 While this sentiment was useful while the Allies were in contest against
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Napoleon, it quickly became a liability and an obstacle after conflict ceased. To
Castlereagh, the support of Italian nationalism had been “excusable” because “we were
justified in running all risks,” but he quickly asserted that a continuation of this policy
was unadvisable.48 As with the issue of the settlement in Saxony, Parliament held strong
opinions—and little information—on the settlement in Italy. The Whigs supported the
nationalist movement in Italy and criticized Austrian power in that region.49 While the
Whigs spoke irreconcilably of freedom for Genoa and nationalism in Italy, the Tories
supported the strengthening of Sardinia. Though nationalism was useful, Castlereagh
focused instead on the needs for balance of power in Europe and sacrificed the desires of
the people of Italy for Austrian compensation and a stronger Piedmont-Sardinia.
The issue of nationalism in Poland is muddled by its history of division and the
fears of the other Great Powers over Russian influence in Central Europe. The Whigs
supported a separate Polish state, a bold and ambitious goal given its partitions.50
Castlereagh saw the appeals of Tsar Alexander as a shameless power grab covered by fair
sentiment.51 His eventual support of a Polish state was an attempt to make a buffer
limiting the ambitions of Russia in Central Europe. While the issue of nationalism did not
take hold and dictate the policies of the Great Powers at Vienna, the movement did play a
factor in the propaganda at the Congress. Castlereagh supported and abjured the
sentiment of nationalism in his turn, not due to wavering ideology, but due to a realist
desire to maintain peace in Europe.
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As with nationalism, the other flaw laid against Castlereagh is a charge of overconservatism and ideological rigidity. While some of Castlereagh’s contemporaries and
successors asserted that he reinforced European conservatism and tied Britain to despotic
Powers, this view either relies on the mischaracterization of his goals or on a
misunderstanding of European ideological trends. Percy Shelley compared Castlereagh to
the gruesome figure of death in The Masque of Anarchy and George Byron called
Castlereagh an “intellectual eunuch” who combined despotism with foolishness.52 The
criticisms against Castlereagh do draw attention to his failure in publishing his political
thoughts or of passing them on to a successor, but it does not necessarily imply that he
did not approach his international politics with a great deal of forethought and
experience. In the most sweeping terms, European conservatism rests on the necessity or
sanctity of the rights of the monarchy and the ancien regime. While some states looked to
utilitarian benefits of a central authority under the monarch and nobility, others focused
more on the supposed providential nature of the aristocracy—their legitimacy as ordained
by God. European liberalism was a mixture of greater control by the aristocracy over the
monarchy (a push back against absolutism) with greater receptiveness to popular opinion.
It was rare for any European state to seek out local involvement in decision making. Even
the extreme Committee of Public Safety and the political parties of the French Revolution
feared the disorder of over-participation by the wrong sort in statecraft.53 There is a
logical fallacy in the work of some popular historians that equate Castlereagh’s goals at
the Congress with either liberal or conservative goals. Castlereagh did have forays into
liberal ideology, and later allied with Tories in Parliament, but his goals in foreign policy
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were pragmatic in nature. There is little evidence to suggest that Castlereagh’s
international policy was directed by what he thought would support conservative or
liberal ideology. He did not go to war to make Europe safe for constitutional monarchies
nor did he expect himself to redirect the currents of internal politics in Europe.
Most authors, no matter their attention to detail, gloss over Castlereagh’s
background and ideology. The most recent entry in the scholarship, John Bew’s
Castlereagh, circumvents this trap and instead discusses Robert Stewart as a man of his
time with a full discussion of his familial, ideological, and governmental background.
Bew fully covers Castlereagh's life in Ireland and his early actions against Napoleon with
Pitt to demonstrate his social, ethnic, and ideological context. Rather than focus on the
international upheaval of the period or the political exchanges between the Great Powers,
Bew’s focus allows the reader to ignore the arguments of absolute political ideologies
and long-term military concerns. Instead, he brings the chaos and ad hoc nature of the
Napoleonic conflict and diplomacy to life.
Bew spends an inordinate amount of time in his book covering Castlereagh’s
actions and goals during his time of political power in Ireland.54 Rather than a colorful
beginning, this material on Castlereagh in Ireland serves to counter those who assert that
Castlereagh was a pure reactionary. At Vienna, his desire for a swift settlement—to the
exclusion of the lesser powers—was not a conservative power-grab to bolster the ailing
ranks of the ancien regime. Castlereagh objected to the threat of military dominance in
Europe; as such, he had to tread the delicate balance between limiting the possible
resurgence of French power and the current control of so much territory by Russia.55
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Where his book shines is how it puts all of the actions of Castlereagh in context.
Castlereagh’s education, family stresses, ideological pragmatism, struggles with
Parliament, and battles over the Act of Union and the future of Ireland all play a part in
his policy. Bew’s exhaustive research into the life of Castlereagh avoids the hasty labels
of Conservative or Reactionary. While the letters and official government documents
from the Congress would give an indication as to what Castlereagh planned for settled
Europe, the inclusion of an ideological background gives the historian a fuller
understanding of his plans and purposes. Even though men can break free of their social
conditioning, Castlereagh’s background undoubtedly affected the realism of his
diplomatic approach and his plan for the neutralization of future French aggression.
Castlereagh’s Congressional Legacy
The historiography of the Congress of Vienna and Castlereagh are rich fields that
span more than a century. However, there do seem to be some fundamental issues that
limit the effectiveness of some of the works. Most historians have no clear definition of
what they mean when discussing institutions and events, fail to fully address the effects
of the issues in a larger European and world context, and entertain unreasonable
expectations of Castlereagh and his peers.
While Webster and Schroeder are careful with their use of terms in this
historiography, others are less exact. There is a whiggish propensity to treat the various
coalitions formed by Pitt and Castlereagh against the Revolution and Napoleon as false
starts for the inevitable Sixth Coalition. Whether willing or otherwise, authors present the
coalitions as failed attempts to build the Europe of 1815 rather than separate political
unions that were based around the goals of politicians, economic concerns, and the
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success or failures of armies in the field. There is a similar propensity for authors to treat
the Sixth Coalition and the Quadruple Alliance as if they were the same thing. The
former was a large collection of greater and lesser European states arrayed against
Napoleonic France, while the latter was a concerted plan by Britain, Russia, Austria, and
Prussia designed to oppose Napoleon, secure peace, and to endure after the end of
hostiles. To treat these two alliances as one is to give unwarranted legitimacy to the
Quadruple Alliance’s decisions at the Congress of Vienna and subsequent Congresses.
The Congresses themselves are problematic in the historiography, as there is a propensity
to discuss the Congress System and Concert of Europe interchangeably. The former
ended in the 1820s, while the latter was an idea appealed to in Europe up until the Great
War.56
Webster, Temperley, Schroeder, and Kissinger all take time to pull back from the
specifics of their research and assert the overall importance of what they are discussing.
Many of their latter-day peers, however, avoid addressing the larger questions raised by
the Congress and the peace in Europe. Zamoyski focuses on the fate of Poland, King is
interested with the pageantry and personal factors, and John Bew’s work is remarkably
thorough but limited to Castlereagh. These types of social and personal studies are useful
to the field and attract new historians, but this meticulousness could be channeled in other
ways. Zamoyski, King, and Bew could take their detailed, yet riveting manner of
research and direct it to what figures thought of the Congress System, balance of power,
and the intersection of foreign diplomacy with local politics. The trend of displaying
Castlereagh and Canning as opposing figures lingers. While the heirs of Pitt did disagree
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on how to preserve Britain, their underlying goals were similar. Both sought the defeat of
Napoleon, limit the power and reach of the Holy Alliance, free Latin America from
European influence, and obtain reapproachment with the United States. These issues
strained the relationship between the two men, but it is unreasonable to cast them as
opposing forces. For all of their differences, they moved within the same social circles,
had similar upbringings, and the same entertained general political philosophy.
Most of the texts written on the Congress of Vienna in the last few decades have
been kinder to Castlereagh than his contemporaries. No longer seen as a villain who sold
out the liberals of Europe to dally with monarchs, he was a statesman who tempered his
ideals with realism and a firm belief in utilitarianism in international power politics.
Castlereagh’s goals at Vienna to encircle France and neutralize its aggression as well as
win a lasting peace were not some ephemeral plan born to protect his peers’ social
privilege or to solely advance Britain’s interests. Castlereagh pursued both Britain’s
national interest and Europe’s ultimate good by the pursuit of peace—a lasting peace that
was made possible by his ideological background, strategic and diplomatic experiences,
tireless effort, and willingness to make difficult and sometimes repellent choices at the
settlement in Vienna.
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Chapter Two
Castlereagh before the Congress
While men’s goals and desires are not the sole result of their upbringing—their
early education, political leanings, and public actions undoubtedly matter. Regardless of
the future arrayed for Castlereagh, his background affected his later political and
diplomatic policies. Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, was born the 18th of June,
1769, to a respected and ambitious Scots-Irish family.57 He was the second son of Robert
Stewart and Lady Sarah Stewart, whose first child had died that same year as
Castlereagh’s birth. His mother, the Lady Sarah, followed her first child Alexander into
the grave in July 1770. Castlereagh’s father, Lord Londonderry, threw himself into his
political career in Dublin, and his son received a warm upbringing at their home, Mount
Stewart. As a child, Castlereagh was clever, quick, and healthy.58 His youthful
exuberance was full of an active social life among his Irish peers, but he did have some
missteps in dealing with the fairer sex. At one point, Castlereagh dueled with a member
of the local gentry to defend his conduct with a young woman under the gentryman’s
charge. More salacious was the claim that he had pursued, won, and gotten a child on a
young serving maid named Nelly Stoal. The truth is unknown, but the Stewarts did give
her a cottage and financial support of 100 pounds a year—and Castlereagh would call on
her whenever he was nearby. In spite of these issues, at the age of 16, Castlereagh stayed
in London for his first introduction to public society. By 1785, he took part in political
life and attended meetings at the House of Commons.
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The fortunes of the Stewarts improved during Castlereagh’s childhood after his
father entered into an advantageous second marriage in 1775. He achieved the position of
Privy Councilor in Ireland in 1795 and became Earl of Londonderry in 1789. It was after
his father’s ascension to Earl of Londonderry that Robert achieved the courtesy title of
Viscount Castlereagh. These changes increased the family’s involvement in the Irish
peerage and exposed Castlereagh to the writings of the English Enlightenment and Ulster
Irish Whigs and patriots. This familiarity played an important role in his later push for the
Act of Union.59 The early years of Castlereagh’s life took place in a background of
political upheaval. Under various English monarchs, Ireland suffered a systematic loss of
land to English peers and the division of large family holdings due to inheritance laws
designed to divide Irish holdings into ever-smaller plots. The dominance of the
Parliament in Ireland was due in part to the policy excluding Catholics from holding
office. While Castlereagh had a pleasant childhood, the confluence of economic, social,
political, and religious conflict between English, Irish, Anglican Irish, and Catholic Irish
influenced his early political trials.60
Castlereagh’s political life began in earnest after his return from Cambridge. This
return coincided with a push by his father to reassert the family’s interests against an Irish
political rival, Lord Downshire, in the Irish Parliament, and his ascendancy to peerage as
the Lord of Londonderry in 1789. In spite of his vigorous support of his father and his
own campaigning, Castlereagh was ambivalent about a life in politics in Ireland with its
“petty provincial politics” and the rudeness of its court compared to “English knowledge,
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and more enlightened knowledge.”61 His ascendancy to the House coincided with that of
Arthur Wellesley, a man whose fortune intertwined with Castlereagh’s.62 He sat in
Parliament for ten years, during which time Ireland enjoyed comparably greater freedom
than it had from the direct influence of England. This freedom was in part due to the
harsh criticism of Henry Grattan, a political firebrand, whose call for a separate
Parliamentary rule for Ireland continually undermined the goals of the English
Parliament.63 Castlereagh succeeded in finding a balance between those in the Irish
Parliament who called for greater freedom, and his own connections and interests in the
English Parliament. In particular, he maintained a relationship with William Pitt’s
administration.64
In his time in Parliament, Castlereagh defied easy polarization by contemporaries
and historians alike. His background in Irish liberalism, contacts with the realism of Pitt,
and own musings on the role of government stumped those who would ascribe him a
simple political label. He disapproved of the spread of Thomas Paine’s Rights of Man
because it “alter’d the people of Ireland”, supported Burke’s Reflections on the
Revolution in France in spite of some inconsistencies between Burke’s sentiments and
those of Irish Whigs, and initially celebrated the fall of the Bastille.65 In a trip to Spa in
the Netherlands, Castlereagh saw the Revolution firsthand. In a letter to his grandfather,
Castlereagh laid out what he saw as the three principle goals of a government: protect
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personal liberty, protect personal property, and keep taxes within reasonable levels. He
found the French government wanting the first two areas. Apart from his time at Spa,
Castlereagh also traveled to Paris. After observing the National Assembly in session, he
said that the Revolution had “done much to approve and much to condemn,” and that “an
essential change was necessary for the happiness and dignity of a great people, long in a
state of degradation.” 66
However, Castlereagh’s subsequent discomfort with Revolutionary France
affected his relationship with those in Ireland who supported an independence movement
to separate them from Britain. In his first speech delivered in February 1791, he insisted
that the admission of Ireland into trade with the Far East or India should be based on “not
a spirit of local partiality, but as a member of the British Empire.” While Castlereagh’s
commitment to the idea of a separate Ireland endured until the later revolt, he was already
weighing the benefits of working within the British Empire against the possible dangers
of trying to leave it. While Castlereagh desired greater freedom for Ireland, his time on
the Continent had soured him to those who postulated a similar revolution in Ireland or
an international alliance with France.67 His discomfiture was not over the revolution of
the French people against the ancien regime, for which he had criticism, but over its
disrupting effects on society and mistreatment of the individual.
Castlereagh’s break with his independence-minded, Irish colleagues began with
the arrest of a Charles Hamilton Teelings, a former acquaintance of the family who had
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been in contact with the French government about the possibility of a French invasion.68
Castlereagh’s arrest of Teelings was only one of many as the threat of collaborators with
the feared French invasion gave way to increased government reaction. Castlereagh
shared a public role in these arrests, and as time went on, the popularity of Castlereagh
and his family in Ireland sank to an all-time low as peers who had hoped for greater
autonomy looked on the family with fear and distrust. He took up a residence in Dublin
Castle, the seat of British power in Ireland, and sought to maintain peace and limit those
who might have helped France. Contrary to the popular belief of his contemporaries,
Castlereagh was not able to wield sinister powers from within Dublin Castle, spurring
betrayal and treachery among the independence-minded. In fact, he was unprepared for
the confluence of external and internal threats. As Castlereagh heard that ships from
Toulon were moving to lead and invasion into Ireland, the country stirred in discontent
that would end in revolt in 1789. In response to the French invasion, Castlereagh led a
group of militia—though awkwardly arranged—around the coast of Ireland, traipsing
around the countryside without certainty of where the French might land.69
While this invasion came to naught, the confluence of Castlereagh’s support of
British interests over Irish and the “repelling” of French forces set the tone for three
defining characteristics of his career: his harsh legacy at home, hid struggle for the Act of
Union, and a steadfast fight against the military dangers of the French Revolution.70 The
arrests of so many revolutionaries, his seat of power at the traditionally reviled Dublin
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Castle, and his military maneuvers against the French invasion earned Castlereagh the
hatred of many peers in Ireland. Castlereagh’s earnest affection for Ireland and his fears
over Ireland’s fate if it separated from Britain tempered his actions. He did not sell out
his peers in Ireland who supported a separate Parliament for the praise of his allies in
London, instead he chose the economic connections and tranquility that Britain could
provide in the long term over what he had seen of French anarchy in Spa and Paris.71
Aside from the economic benefit to Ireland, Castlereagh feared what ruin a war between
Britain and France fought in Ireland would do to his native land. If Castlereagh had a
private political philosophy, it was more in tune with classical liberalism as opposed to
Tory-monarchism.72 His goal was peace and he had a profound respect for the mixed
system of government in Britain that checked mob rule and tyranny while also supporting
means for more direct governmental control and the trappings of popular participation.
Regardless of his ideals, Castlereagh’s pragmatism towards the conflict with
Revolutionary and Napoleonic France overcame what more ephemeral desires he may
have had for policy.
While Castlereagh’s efforts kept returning him to the familial and governmental
duties in Ireland, his heart and interests pulled him back to London. Castlereagh had
grown up in Ireland and achieved political success there, but his preferences lay in
London politics, especially with William Pitt. Encouraged by his grandfather Lord
Camden, Castlereagh attended several of Pitts debates at Westminster during his time at
Cambridge between 1787 and 1788.73 Castlereagh did not always approve of the Pittites
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in Ireland itself. In particular, he held the Lord Lieutenant in Ireland, the Earl
Westmorland, in scant regard.74 Convinced of his role as an impediment to reform,
Castlereagh was clear that he “shall not lament his [Westmorland’s] departure.”75
Castlereagh received a good deal of advice from Lord Camden and William Pitt to help
him navigate between the conflicting loyalties to his peers around the country and the
control of Britain in the Castle at Dublin, but he still suffered from a strained relationship
with many of his peers.76 After having worked together, Pitt pressed Castlereagh into the
position of Secretary of State for War as part of a plan to hurriedly make up two allies
that Pitt had just lost in Parliament. This new office served Castlereagh in the short term,
making up for his electoral defeat in the County Down, but in the long term, it also
served a greater purpose. His position kept him in contact with Pitt during the peace
memorandum that Pitt drew up with Russia in 1805.77 Pitt’s plan later served as a map to
Castlereagh for the settlement of Europe. When Castlereagh came to the Foreign Office,
he continued this close working relationship and assisted in the drafted peace settlement
of 1805.78
Castlereagh’s policies were born of his own experiences and political philosophy,
but Pitt’s policies on strategic reaction to French aggression and future settlement of
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Europe affected Castlereagh’s later goals at the Congress. Pitt’s international policy
focused on some form of coalition against unrestrained France that involved a system of
guarantees and legitimacy within international law. Two prime examples of Pitt’s policies
include a letter he assisted in writing to M.F. Chauvelin in December 1792 and a
memorandum he wrote to Tsar Alexander in January 1805.79 The letter to Chauvelin
spoke about concern over the call of the Convention in France to “encourage disorder and
revolt in all countries, even in those which are neutral.”80 While the extreme discomfiture
of the British government of a foreign power advocating their overthrow was bad enough,
more contentious was the irreconcilability of proposed French policy and its military
actions. While French leaders abjured the annexation of territory in November 1792, they
launched an attack upon the capital of Antwerp, Scheldt. The British government found
the continued promise of the Revolutionary government to respect, “the independence
and rights of England and her allies” coupled with a demonstrated intent to “maintain
these open and injurious aggressions” against the holdings of those same states untenable.
This confusing foreign policy indicated a larger fault with the French government,
the false conception that they had the right to set aside the treaties and rights between the
nations of Europe.81 France’s abjuring Britain’s role in the Low Countries while calling
their own seizure a form of justice was galling. While Pitt might have been
uncomfortable with the radical nature of the Revolution towards monarchy, the chief
criticism of the statesmen was never on Revolutionary ideology, it was its execution of its
79
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ideology in a diplomatic framework. Instead of condemning Chauvelin in the lessening of
his monarch, Pitt’s criticisms were over the fomentation of rebellion and French
expansion into the Low Countries. There was a distinction between intervention “for the
purpose of establishing any form of Gov[ernment] in France,” and “a concert between
other Gov[ernment]s to provide for their own security at a time when political interests
are endangered both by the intrigues of France in the interior of other countries, and by
their views of conquest and aggrandizement.”82 Pitt’s focus on the strategic realities was
important for Britain’s foreign policy, but it also had a great influence on Castlereagh’s
eventual views.
In January 1805, Pitt wrote a memorandum to Tsar Alexander after lengthy
discussions with Ambassador Prince Adam Czartoryski.83 The memorandum laid out
three objects that a concert between their countries might achieve. They could free the
sections of Europe that had fallen under French power since the Revolution, build a
barrier against future French aggression, and establish a peace based on conventions and
guarantees for mutual protection and security. Pitt sought a system that guaranteed the
rights of all states, not that undermined local sovereignty.84 The chief military concerns
of the memorandum were the “Evacuation of the North Germany and Italy, the Reestablishment of the Independence of the United Provinces, and of Switzerland, the
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Restoration of the Dominions of the King of Sardinia, and the security of Naples.”85
Coupled with these goals, a more encompassing plan limited future French aggression
and secured a longer peace in Europe. Castlereagh would imitate much of these policies,
especially the settlement of the United Provinces and northern Italy.
Pitt then divided the dominated states of Europe into two groups—those who
could stand on their own against France after restoration, and those countries whose
occupation had destroyed local autonomy and lacked the inherent strength to resist
France. While Pitt eagerly advocated for the independence of the former (the United
Provinces, Switzerland, extended Sardinia, Tuscany, and Modena), he saw the weakness
of the latter (Genoa, the Austrian Netherlands, and much of traditional Austrian Italy that
fell under France) as a danger to Europe. Pitt discussed the parceling out of much of Italy,
but his primary concern was the enlargement of Sardinia, the United Provinces, and of
Prussia. Bolstered Sardinia would serve as a bulwark in Italy, the enlarged United
Provinces would be a less tempting target for France, and strengthened Prussia would
protect the Rhine and the Low Countries. Pitt did temper his generous offer of territory to
Prussia with a provision that it would be limited to secure the support of Austria and
Russia. While Pitt had an eye towards larger European concerns, he continued to work
within the existing diplomatic and strategic system.
Some authors would set up a conflict between Castlereagh and Canning for the
title of Pitt’s political heir, but Castlereagh clearly inherited—and helped form—Pitt’s
plans for peace in Europe. In the midst of 1813, while Castlereagh was building the last
coalition to fight Napoleonic France, Castlereagh wrote, “The main features we are
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agreed upon—to keep France in order, we require great masses—that Prussia, Austria,
and Russia ought to be as great and powerful as they have ever been—and that the
inferior States must be summoned to assist, or pay the forfeit of resistance.” To
demonstrate what his plan for peace would look like, Castlereagh alluded to the
memorandum written by Pitt to Tsar Alexander in 1805, writing,
As an outline to reason from, I send you, as a private communication, a
despatch on which the confederacy in 1805 was founded; the Emperor of
Russia probably has not this interesting document at headquarters:
(interesting it is to my recollection, as I remember having more than one
conversation with Mr. Pitt on the details, before he wrote it) some of the
suggestions may now be inapplicable, but it is so masterly an outline for
the restoration of Europe.86
Years later, in the midst of the Congress of Vienna, Castlereagh again alluded to Pitt’s
memorandum in a letter to the Duke of Wellington, stating, “I am always led to revert to
with considerable favor to a policy which Mr. Pitt, in the year 1806 [sic], had strongly at
the heart, which was to tempt Prussia to put herself forward on the left back of the Rhine,
more in military contact with France.”87 The memorandum of Pitt was a plan for
restructuring Europe to maintain peace, not for solely furthering Britain’s self interest or
Pitt’s personal ideology—and Castlereagh worked with him on putting it together.
Castlereagh was a staunch admirer of Pitt from his earliest introductions to Parliamentary
debates. While Castlereagh’s background tempered his life and political fortunes in
Ireland, Pitt’s political realism greatly influenced Castlereagh’s later opinions on
checking Napoleonic ambitions and the necessity of limiting France. The threat of France
as a direct military force and indirect supporter of economic or social disruption trumped

86

Castlereagh to Cathart, 8, April, 1813 in Castlereagh and Londonderry, vol. 8, 356.
Castlereagh to Wellington, 1, October, 1814, in Webster, British Diplomacy, 1813-1815, 196.
In the original letter Castlereagh misremembers the date of the memorandum. He meant 1805.

87

47

personal opinions on French revolutionary ideology. French bayonets and cannons were a
more pressing fear than any number of maypoles and tricolor ribbons.
Castlereagh’s interaction with Pitt was not limited to absorbing his tutor’s
thoughts on combating France. The two worked together closely in trying to bind Ireland
and Britain. The first issue they had to address was the anger in Ireland over
representation and sovereignty. The dissatisfaction of Ireland on the eve of the rebellion
took no one by surprise. Pitt had long been aware of discontentment in Ireland over the
limited political participation of most Catholics due to the Ascendancy, and the political
and economic domination of Ireland by a minority of Protestant landowners and clergy.
While the Ascendancy spanned over a century, the recent upheaval in Ireland made it
look weak and ineffectual to Protestants in Ireland and British statesmen who hoped to
maintain authority. The waning social domination also looked assailable to those in
Ireland who wanted to some form of home rule. Taking advantage of the waning
confidence of the Ascendancy, Pitt moved forward with the Union.88 Castlereagh, on the
other hand, had extended firsthand experience with the ever-worsening political malaise.
He knew that the Ascendancy could not stand forever and pondered several solutions, the
Union among them.89 The Union would solve Castlereagh’s fears of French domination
as well as his discomfiture with the treatment of the Irish. The British Parliament had
feared domination of Irish Parliament by Catholics over Protestants if there was a union
between the two kingdoms, but if Catholics gained franchise and government office
within a single, unified British kingdom, then they would be a minority and no danger. Of
course, Castlereagh hoped for the Union and the recognition of Irish Catholics.
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In spite of this hope, the Emancipation could not move forward due to a lack of
support in London and the disapproval of local Protestant elites in Ireland. The Union
itself was quickly pushed forward with Castlereagh’s insistence that delay would only
cause greater unrest.90 In spite of unrest around Dublin, the recompense for lost
Parliamentary seats and the paying off of members of the peerage moved the Act of
Union forward. While the Union succeeded, the movement of Catholics into political life
would have to wait until 1829. The introduction of Catholics into Parliament, the
Catholic Emancipation that Castlereagh and Pitt supported, failed due to King George
III’s belief that the participation of the Catholics would undermine his coronation oath.
Castlereagh and Pitt’s relationship was not some passing political alliance made
for the sake of convenience. Pitt’s influence directed Castlereagh’s most important
policies. On one hand, Castlereagh’s personal and ideological connection pulled him
towards the Irish Whigs; on the other, he rejected the Irish Rebellion due fear of French
dominance and destruction in case of a war between France and Britain on Irish soil. Pitt
and Castlereagh worked together to push through the Act of Union, merging Ireland into
the larger state. Though the plans for Emancipation failed, Pitt’s eased some of
Castlereagh’s concerns over the fate of Ireland. Castlereagh and Pitt’s shared policies
towards France and plans for a settlement of Europe became the benchmark of
Castlereagh’s goals for the defeat of France and the restructuring of the European state
system. Castlereagh’s steadfast distrust of the strategic goals of Revolutionary and
Napoleonic France were due to his own personal experiences with the disorders of the
Revolution and close discussions with Pitt. Their shared plan for a settlement of Europe
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and an encirclement of France was a policy that Castlereagh would carry from London to
Vienna.
While Castlereagh would be involved in military ventures all over Europe during
his time in the War and Foreign Offices, his disastrous ordering of the Walcheren
Expedition is what prompted his duel with Canning. In 1797, in the midst of the French
occupied Low Countries lay the river Scheldt and the island Walcheren. Housing a royal
armory, Walcheren served as an ideal setting-out point from which to attack London. 91
The temporary success of Austria’s fighting in the field and the erroneous information on
the disposition of the town meant that the attack went ahead.92 The force that Castlereagh
sent to the Netherlands was larger than that serving in the Peninsular campaign, but the
attack failed miserably. The troops landed and captured the island of Walcheren, only to
take ill from the swamp surrounding the island. More than 4,000 of the 20,000 men sent
died or returned injured from the attack and ill-managed siege. Walcheren, along with
other failures that fell under Castlereagh’s purview at the War Department, broiled in
public and Parliamentary discontent. George Canning had been making moves against
Castlereagh, but dissembled support. While there are accounts (reiterated at the duel) that
Canning wanted to inform Castlereagh as to the precariousness of his position, but he was
unable to.93 Regardless, when Canning’s support of Castlereagh ceased with the news of
the disaster at Walcheren, Castlereagh assumed that his one-time colleague was a
“perfidious enemy” who had betrayed him.
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Setting aside all of the failed coalitions and reversals of combat that the Allied
Powers went through against France from 1789-1815, one singularly important outcome
arose from the conflicts: the fear that another force like the French Revolution and the
Napoleon Wars might wreak terrible destruction on Europe. The Great Powers—
diplomats and sovereigns alike—had gone through such a ruinous cycle of recurring war
and peace that the leaders of that generation had a firm intent to form a lasting peace. The
Great Powers were not just continuing their early games of balance and quest for
aggrandizement; the conflict they had witnessed with its death toll, loss of property, and
disorder of society on such a drastic scale taught them that while wrangling and
disagreements may go on, the rules needed to change.
After the defeat of Napoleon, all of Europe was in jubilation. The Great Powers
had at last made peace in Europe, but issues of peace were not at rest. The territorial and
political confusion was especially acute for the Central European powers of Austria and
Prussia. Both the armies and diplomats of Austria had worn themselves out with constant
toil. It had lost its holdings in Italy, mislaid swathes of land in the German States, entered
financial ruin, and suffered many blows to prestige in its military defeats. With peace
established, Austria’s monarch Emperor Francis and his preeminent statesman Prince
Clemens von Metternich hoped that they would secure lands taken from Austria and find
some succor against the rising power of Russia and Prussia.94 Prussia weathered the
storm of the Revolution due to geography and fickle political dealings with Napoleon.
Though Prussia moved close to Russia near the end of the conflict, it suffered a partition
by Napoleon as penance for its duplicity. King Frederick William III of Prussia and
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diplomat Prince Karl August von Hardenburg hoped to find some form of compensation
from the Congress of Vienna. They eyed the Duchy of Warsaw, the Kingdom of Saxony,
and other sections of Northern Germany that they could bring under their sway.95
Castlereagh had been in close contact with Metternich in the last days of Napoleon, but
Metternich’s final separation from Bonaparte came at a time that he thought most
beneficial to Austrian interests. While Metternich was exceedingly clever in the manner
and timing of his reapproachment with the Allies, he was not the key figure holding the
group together.
Russia faired comparably well in the Napoleonic Wars, using the lull of combat
after the first phase in 1793 to round off portions of Poland.96 After the rout of Napoleon
in 1812, Russian forces pushed on through the German States and liberated them from
French control. The image, true or feigned, that Tsar Alexander defeated Napoleon and
rescued Europe vastly increased his prestige and power. Trappings of high purpose and
mysticism followed Alexander across the fields of Germany and only increased during
the Peace of Paris. Alexander represented the interests of Russia at the Congress of
Vienna while pursuing the contradictory roles of liberator in Central Europe and
expander of Russian influence.97 In the last days of the war against Napoleon,
Castlereagh’s opinion of Alexander improved, though at the Congress Castlereagh would
quickly grow to distrust Alexander’s motivations.98

95

King, 6-9.
May, 9.
96
This is of course not to underplay the destruction of Napoleon’s invasion.
97
King, 25-27
May, 9-12
Gulick, 187-189
98
Castlereagh to Liverpool, 3, March, 1814, in Webster, British Diplomacy, 1813-1815, 163.

52

Britain accrued benefits and disadvantages from the Revolutionary and
Napoleonic Wars. Under Pitt and Castlereagh, Britain snatched up colonies of France,
Denmark, the Knights of Malta, and other territories in the midst of the wars. Unlike the
other Powers, the island fastness of Britain did not come under direct assault due to the
diligence of the British navy. However, Britain incurred a massive war debt in keeping its
navy afloat, subsidizing its continental allies, and it continued to fight on a second front
with the United States in the War of 1812. All of the Great Powers answered to their
aristocracy and military on some level. Britain had the singular problem of a vocal press
and an active Parliament. The opinions of the voting populace, small though it may have
been, affected the choices the British government made and how they approved
Congressional decisions. This discontent would be especially true of the later treatment
of Genoa, Saxony, Norway, and Poland. Castlereagh, while battling a disagreeable
Parliament, endeavored to maintain peace in Europe, secure their trading empire abroad,
and set up a system that would deal with the rising pretensions of Tsar Alexander.99 One
of the lynchpins in Castlereagh’s play would be the fate of France.
France was defeated, but unconquered. The loss of men, material, and goods from
France during the Revolution was unprecedented. Equally unprecedented was how many
lands the other Great Powers let it keep. Holdings that France had won along its natural
frontiers remained, Britain returned several colonies that it had seized, and France was
not required to suffer any ignominious blow to prestige.100 The paintings and art that been
looted from Germany, Italy, and Holland were left in La Louvre because of their beauty
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when arrayed together. France would indeed occupy the thoughts of many, especially
Britain, in their fears of a returned hegemony, but this concern did not intrinsically
engender international discourtesy or mistreatment. Instead, France benefitted by earning
a surprising amount of respect. The treatment toward France after its defeat is one of the
best examples of the fundamental change in European politics in the Congress of Vienna
and the Concert of Europe. Charles Maurice de Talleyrand protected the dignity and
power of his country at the Congress, attempting to bring Britain into its good graces and
set up spheres of influence in the German States.101
While the Congress at Vienna settled more issues than the just territorial
settlement of Italy, Germany, Poland, and the Low Countries, these issues were of
singular importance to Castlereagh. It did not lie in his power to hold back the tides of the
world and force peace on Europe. The Great Powers were war weary, but if Castlereagh
was to turn this respite into a lasting peace, he would have to build bastions of power in
Europe to curb the predatory interests of figures like ambitious Napoleon or messianic
Alexander. After the Peace of Paris, the threat of French forces in Holland had been
resolved, but Castlereagh took further steps to remove the danger of future enemies
seizing the Low Countries with ease.
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Chapter Three
The Congress of Vienna
The Settlement of the Netherlands
In retrospect, the settlement of the Netherlands may seem to be the least of
Castlereagh’s successes. In his negotiations with the House of Orange and the
consolidation of the Netherlands, he had relatively little disruption from the other Great
Powers.102 However, the settlement of the Netherlands is of great importance in what it
shows about Castlereagh’s approach to Britain’s strategic concerns. The Dutch Republic
held a connection with Britain since the arrival of William of Orange in the Glorious
Revolution of 1688. Edmund Burke in 1791 said that “Holland might justly be considered
a necessary part of this country as Kent.”103 It was the invasion of this strategic region
that prompted Pitt’s support of military action against France. The Netherlands, and the
Low Countries in total, had long been the fighting ground between French, Prussian,
Hapsburg, and British interests. The Prussian invasion of the Dutch Republic in
September 1787 and the occupation of the region by French Revolutionary forces in 1795
highlighted the precariousness of this region and the necessity of bolstering in against
outside threats. While Britain did pursue a policy to tie the Netherlands to Britain through
a dynastic union, Castlereagh was interested in how it affected his plans for Britain’s
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immediate security and for a stronger Northern Germany that could resist French
aggression.104
In the midst of the last coalition arrayed against Napoleon, Holland—the
economic center of northern Europe—was central to Britain’s security. The high level of
urbanization, sheltered harbors, and the short distance from London made its separation
from France a necessity for Britain.105 When a revolt supported by Castlereagh broke out
in Holland on November 15, 1813, Castlereagh sent a diplomat, an improvised military
force, and 100,000 pounds to support British interests in the region and to help enthrone
Prince William VI of Orange in the ancient republic. Hoping to strengthen the connection
between the Netherlands and Britain, a dynastic union between Charlotte the Princess of
Wales and the Hereditary Prince William II, the son of the new king of the Netherlands,
seemed politically advantageous. Castlereagh was personally involved in some of these
interactions, gaining a private audience with the Hereditary Prince in January 1814.106
This plan failed due to natural frictions between the couple and the possible interference
of the Russian Grand Duchess Catharine who hoped to win the hand for a Russian Grand
Duke and thus strengthen Russian interests in the region.107 These difficulties aside,
Castlereagh was insistent on the strengthening of the Netherlands in spite of possible
slights to the personal honor of Princess Charlotte. The British government did its utmost
to maintain positive relations between the two countries, offering the Prince of Orange
the command of a Hanoverian regiment. Four months, later Castlereagh reasserted that
the first objective was to “provide effectually against the systemic views of France to
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possess herself of the Low Countries and the territories on the left bank of the Rhine.”108
His strengthening of the Netherlands proceeded through three different goals. He secured
the recognition of protection by the other Great Powers, garnered territory for the new
state, and pushed for a series of fortresses along the border between the Netherlands and
France.
Francis of Austria willingly gave up his holdings in the Low Countries, aware that
he could not effectively control and govern them in a manner to his liking. With that,
Castlereagh was able to secure the support of the Great Powers for the freedom of the
Netherlands.109 With that guarantee, Castlereagh could focus on the internal strength of
the country. While some in the British government had considered taking lands that were
ancestrally French and giving them to a larger state in the Netherlands, Castlereagh
realized that “if you take part of old France and add it to Belgium, all France will, as a
point of honour, be anxious to regain it.”110 Instead, Castlereagh endeavored to combine
the Austrian Netherlands with the Dutch Republic to create a larger, more resilient state.
Peers of Castlereagh suggested the Act of Union that he earlier pushed forward with Pitt
be the guiding document for reconciling the two territories. The liberal constitution that
the Prince of Orange signed and the guarantees he enjoyed abroad made the borrowing of
the Act of Union unnecessary.
For Castlereagh, another territorial tool for strengthening the Netherlands was the
restoration of colonies seized during the war. While some of the larger issues were mute
due to the agreement at the Treaty of Paris that if the Netherlands were strong enough to
resist attack it would get back many of its seized colonies, the restoration of particular
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colonies remained in question. Britain kept the wealthy Dutch East Indies, but returned
the West Indian Isles. The settlement of the West Indian islands and Guiana was more
difficult. British merchants had been heavily investing in the region. Before Castlereagh
arrived there had been a plan to pay Sweden 1,000,000 pounds for renouncing the island
of Guadeloupe due to French refusal to part with it in the peace settlement. In
recompense for the re-establishment of the Netherlands and its union with Belgium,
Holland would pay the price to Sweden. With Castlereagh’s involvement in this
settlement, he pushed his policies over the discomfort of some in the Netherlands and
came to a rather fair settlement. Britain kept the settlements on Guiana and allowed the
Dutch to trade with them. In compensation, Britain would pay 1,000,000 pounds to
Sweden, pay off half of the Russian debt in Holland (3,000,000 pounds), and pay
2,000,000 pounds for the Cape. Looking at the deal closely, Holland was only getting
2,000,000 new pounds for the settlement. They did not benefit from the other 4,000,000
taking into account the debt Russia already owed them and the new Swedish debt foisted
on them. Their windfall of 2,000,000 would not go to their coffers however, but would
instead go to build fortresses and fortifications between France and the Netherlands.111
Castlereagh fought hard for a series of fortresses between the Netherlands and
France. There was no distress on the part of the other Great Powers, but instead internal
antagonism in Britain towards the idea that Britain paid for the war against Napoleon and
that it would have to pay for the peace as well.112 This economic reluctance was the main
reason why Castlereagh hid the cost of the fortifications in the Netherlands under the
blanket of a colonial settlement. Castlereagh supported the building of the fortifications,
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but this did not translate into a “blank-check” for the safety of all the territories of the
Low Countries. As time went on, Castlereagh grew wary of entangling guarantees on the
continent. He said later that the guarantee on the Low Countries was “an engagement
fundamental and inseparable from our policy,” while the guarantee of forts against
France was “incidental and auxiliary, a mere question of expediency, of means to an
end.”113 The purpose of the forts was not to serve as an eternal inroad of British power
into the continent; it was to guard the Netherlands against France.
The establishment of a monarchy in the Low Counties with the help of
Castlereagh and its expansion could be viewed as a conservative move on the part of
Castlereagh, a goal to reinforce the monarchies of Europe. It is true that Castlereagh
played a role in re-establishing the House of Orange, but the assumption of a
conservative motive relies on a false premise: that the reestablishment of the House of
Orange was the underlying goal of Castlereagh’s actions. If Castlereagh only wanted to
reestablish Orange, he would have no need to strengthen it with territory from the
Austrian Netherlands, would not have tied it with such a loose constitution, nor would he
have invested so much effort in providing it with the means to better resist France.
Castlereagh fought for more territory for the Netherlands, but did not manage to provide
it with all he had hoped.114 The constitution binding the Prince of Orange was not
empowering, it was similar to that of the King of England. Castlereagh could have fought
for a more conservative model, similar to the rest of the monarchic states on the
continent, with greater power invested in the Prince. He did not pursue this goal,
however; instead, he built a more liberal state to better placate the Prince’s new subjects.
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Some still argue that Castlereagh could have been building a state like Britain, exporting
constitutional monarchism. This argument flies in the face of his settlements in the rest of
Europe and his opinions on the precariousness of the Prince in his new country.115
The establishment of the fortresses along the border between France and Denmark
does not make sense if his goals were politically conservative. The fortresses arose with
great expense and diplomatic horse-trading. These fortresses were not a series minute
Bastilles to bolster the Prince in a hostile state, they were bulwarks against renewed
French aggression. In a letter to Wellington, Castlereagh lamented the lack of land given
to the new Netherlands state, noting that “some modification may be effected, but the
great question for them, as well as for us, is to weight what is the best security for peace,
and for keeping the Low Countries out of the hands of France.”116 Castlereagh’s policy in
the Netherlands did not rest on ideological goals, but on a need to build it up against
France.
The Settlement of Italy
Castlereagh had a larger goal of peace and security in Europe, but the convoluted
dynastic and diplomatic webs that covered the Italian peninsula proved to be stumbling
blocks. The settlement of Italy following the defeat of Napoleon was complicated
because it involved the settlement of three different questions in one region: the issue of
Marshal Joachim Murat as king of Naples and how his removal affected plans for
Bourbon resumption in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the restitution of the Papal
States, and the fate of Italian settlements in northern Italy in the strengthening of Sardinia
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and Austria.117 Murat was a destabilizing factor on the peninsula, and Castlereagh needed
to remove him from power before he could achieve a lasting peace. In regards to the
Papal States, the peace of Europe was not contingent on strengthening its borders. Its
preservation and restitution was important for the purposes of guarantees and reliance on
international law. French swift inroads into Europe had been possible in large part
because of the political fragmentation of northern Italy. Genoa had been a comparably
neutral state in the conflict between France and the Allied Powers, and it had hoped to
maintain its sovereignty upon the cessation of hostilities. However, the need for a secure
and strong buffer state in northern Italy to offset French influence involved merging
Genoa into the Kingdom of Sardinia.118 This issue is a microcosm of the rest of the
territorial issues in the Congress of Vienna, how Castlereagh dealt with the dispersion of
territories and peoples to guarantee security against general warfare in Europe.
The participation of the Italian peninsula in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic
Wars centered on the strategic importance of Italy, its history of dynastic division, and its
military geographic dispersion. As a military and diplomatic lever, southern Italy served
as a barrier for British interests in the Levant against dedicated French incursion, while
northern Italy served as a potential route to Austria filled with states of mixed suzerainty
to the Hapsburgs. The peninsula had been the seat of contest between Hapsburgs, Valois,
and Bourbon, and the conquest of the region would serve as a crucial morale multiplier
out of synch with its strategic value. While Napoleon had resounding success in northern
Italy with the accruing of massive indemnities and the movement of artwork back to
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France, southern Italy was a highly contested region. The politics in Naples were often
confused, Napoleon’s response to the Holy See constantly shifted, and Sicily became a
staging ground for British naval power in the Mediterranean.119
The first inroads into Italy occurred with the peaceful annexation of Savoy and
the more brutal conquest of Nice. Both of these incursions were at the expense of the
House of Savoy.120 While the destruction of Rome and the defeat of Austrian forces in
Italy were ripe targets for French forces, they demurred and refocused on German and
Dutch territories. The most glorious victories in Italy would later fall to Napoleon.121
Diplomatically, Italy served as a staging ground for Napoleon’s politics and further
harassment of the Savoys. In December 1801 and January 1802, in the midst of peace
proceedings, Napoleon took control of the Cisalpine Republic and renamed it the Italian
Republic with himself as president. During the seizure of other states and the resettlement
of territories, Napoleon annexed the heart of the Savoy holdings, Piedmont. The
mistreatment of the King of Sardinia (House Savoy) was one of the reasons for Tsar
Alexander’s renewing conflict with Napoleon. It was not that Alexander held a deep and
abiding love for Sardinia, but Napoleon had rebuffed his attempts at mediation to the
great embarrassment of Alexander’s personal prestige.122 Napoleon’s restructuring of the
Italian states in the midst of peace proceedings is indicative of how fundamentally flawed
119

Castlereagh’s peer William Bentinck in Sicily drew attention to the disorder in Sicily in several letters to
Castlereagh, but he always tempered these criticisms with the recognition that Sicily could preserve itself
with proper care of its military and alliances without the aid of Britain.
Castlereagh and Londonderry, vol. 8, 213-233, 322-325.
120
The House of Savoy rose to ducal status by the Holy Roman Empire in the 15th century. They usually
maintained a policy of neutrality between the France and Austria. After the battle of Utrecht in 1713
dukedom raised to a king of Sicily. While the Savoy’s swapped this holding for Sardinia, they had a rich
history of kingship in Italy.
To clarify, the House of Savoy is a family that lived in the region Savoy. For the remainder, the term will
refer to the family and not the region unless explicitly stated.
121
Schroeder, 111-112.
122
Ibid., 237-239, 245, 266-267, 380-381.

62

the early attempts at peace in Europe were after a failed coalition. While some Powers
sought to limit the damage done to them if defeated, most went a step further and
considered how the peace would affect the next, inevitable war. Napoleon went a step
further and deliberately divided his holdings and vassal states in Italy into strategic and
military districts for the raising of men and capital for the next war.123 For Napoleon, the
peace settlement itself was a tool for winning men and resources for the war immediately
to follow. Castlereagh’s peace at Vienna did look towards the strategic necessity of men
and material, but it did so in the hope of maintaining peace, not of wringing the
maximum benefit.
In the midst of the Napoleonic Wars, Castlereagh had been privy to detailed
accounts of Sicily, but his greater interest was in reclaiming Naples from Napoleon’s
control.124 While he was more than willing for a local response in Naples to rise up and
restore Ferdinand II, he thought it “should be in fact a restoration rather than an
election.”125 A plan for a new constitution tempered the proposal for the restoration of the
Bourbons in Naples. Later, William Bentinck tempered this view, saying,
My object was to secure, if possible, to this great population [Sicilian] the
attainment of their blessings which have been placed within their reach, and
which is of the subject of universal desire. Their incapacity to seize this desired
liberty arises from their misfortune, and not their fault, from the nature of the
active and debasing tyranny under which they have lived.126
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While Castlereagh may have preferred restoration to the popular election of a monarch,
his views on liberty and freedom (that he shared discussions on with William Bentinck)
were sanguine for the future but wary of the dominance of another state.
Castlereagh’s goal for Naples was the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in
Sicily, reunifying the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The establishment of Murat on the
throne of Naples hindered this plan. Though Murat participated in Napoleon’s ruinous
campaign against Russia and fought in the French defeat at Leipzig, he survived the rout
from Moscow—and so went on to plague Castlereagh in Italy. Sensing the changes of
fortune as his master fled back into Germany and then France, Murat signed a peace
agreement with Emperor Francis in exchange for 30,000 soldiers from Naples for use
against his father-in-law.127 With the ad hoc legitimization of Murat, the issue of southern
Italy was the choice between of the brigand-turned-king and the restoration of the
dubiously effective House of Bourbon. Both Castlereagh and Metternich were
uncomfortable with the settlement towards Murat, but Castlereagh said,
[A]s Murat’s support became less indispensible, one’s repugnance to the
arrangement in his favour increased. I still believe (however much I dislike it)
that, even at the moment the Treaty was made, it was both wise and necessary.
The only think that can make it palatable will be a liberal arrangement for the
Sicilian family.128
At this point in the peace process, Castlereagh’s opinions of Murat seemed to spring from
his disappointment over the Bourbons, and from Murat’s habit of delaying peace talks to
gain the maximum advantage.129
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Following Napoleon’s abdication and exile to Elba, Castlereagh was in some
difficulty as to how to proceed. He did not want the unpleasant task of dislodging Murat
from Naples, yet having a former officer of Napoleon on a throne, especially one so near
Elba, gave all of his peers cause for concern.130 Metternich and Castlereagh originally
quelled their disapproval of Murat in the name of strategic necessity. Austrian fears over
the possibility of Murat stirring trouble near its holdings in Italy and anger in the House
of Commons over the awarding of Genoa to the Kingdom of Sardinia caused them to
reconsider the issue.131 Despite some public posturing, Castlereagh pursued the removal
of Murat through British and international channels long before Murat’s failure in the
Hundred Days presented them with the perfect opportunity.132 Looking at Castlereagh’s
intent and goals in southern Italy, one sees him supporting the liberty of people of Sicily
(seen through Bentinck’s goals and sentiments on the ground in Italy), supporting the
restoration of the Bourbons in Italy, and being wary of Murat’s control and use of
delaying tactics for diplomatic purposes.
Castlereagh’s goals were the preservation and betterment of the people of
southern Italy. While modern critics, and assuredly some of Castlereagh’s peers, may
have preferred an election of a monarch in Naples, an elected monarch would not
command respect amongst his dynastic peers. Castlereagh’s fears over Murat seem have
been a mixture of distrust of Murat as a tool for Napoleon and his unnecessary extension
of conflict to get the most benefit out of a peace agreement. Castlereagh’s means were
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strategy and diplomacy, but his goal for Europe was peace. While the entire issue of
Italian settlement would have to wait, Murat’s defection to his master in the Hundred
Days took the decision of unilateral British action out of Castlereagh’s hands. The
settlements of Murat’s holdings in southern Italy did not end with the restoration of the
Bourbons, it touched on Castlereagh’s strategic concerns for the rest of Italy.
The issue of the Papal States at the Congress is a small matter, but it is indicative
of the difficulties Castlereagh had in settling strategic borders in Europe with so many
conflicting needs. The French Revolution devastated the Church within France itself.
Rich church holdings were dissolved by the state and traditional clergy privileges were
set aside. In the Papal States themselves, cities and territories under the authority of the
pope fell into the hands of Revolutionary France or Napoleon. Comtat Venaissin and
Avignon were annexed in 1791 as well as the Legations put into part of the Cisalpine
Republic. Revolutionary France invaded the Papal States proper in 1798 and declared a
Roman Republic. Pope Pius VI died in exile in France. Napoleon did not attack the
trappings of the papacy, but he did annex the remainder the Papal States’ territory to
France. Napoleon’s relationship with the papacy rested on his intemperate desire for
control and his desire to use religion as a bulwark of his rule. Napoleon may have
annexed and invaded papal lands, but he reintroduced reforms and restitution to the
Church in France under his proto-police state.133 After the push of Napoleon back to
France, Castlereagh received letters from the Papacy detailing their loyalty and the trials
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they had undergone for the resistance against Napoleonic domination.134 While
Castlereagh might have wanted to recompense the Papal States, he surrendered to the
needs of balance of power concerns for Austria and the raw aggrandizement of Murat.
While the needs of the papacy could be set aside for larger concerns, the holdings of
Austria were paramount in Castlereagh’s plans for Italian security.
The issue of Austria in Italy also troubled Castlereagh. At the Congress, Austria
recouped its holdings in Lombardy and Venetia. While there had initially been hopes in
the local populace for a respite from war and taxation, the necessity of raising levies
against Napoleon in the Hundred Days and the slow administration of the Hapsburgs
meant that this goodwill evaporated in fairly short order. Castlereagh was aware of the
inefficiencies and discontent in the Austrian holdings, but he did not meddle.135 The
territory of Austria in northern Italy needed to be filled out, and Murat delayed and
connived to gain more territory at the expense of the Papacy. While Murat’s defection
would make Castlereagh’s desire to reinforce the Papal States easier, the issues with the
Papacy demonstrate Castlereagh’s limited options due to strategic concerns. Before his
fall, Murat was a necessary tool for the defeat of Napoleon and pacification of the
peninsula. Austrian territories, while of middling importance to Hapsburg’s long-term
interests, were strategically necessary to secure their interests against France in Italy.
While Austria would have some holdings in northern Italy and a restored Bourbon
monarchy would govern in the south, Castlereagh did not think this would be enough to
preserve Italy from the possibility of future French aggression in northern Italy. The
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Kingdom of Sardinia had been strong enough to join the First Coalition against the
French Republic in 1792, but Napoleon thoroughly defeated it in 1796. Castlereagh
originally considered keeping Genoa a free city, though he long knew that any lasting
settlement in Italy required a restoration of the Kingdom of Sardinia.136 While the House
of Savoy held decent holdings in the Piedmont and in the island of Sardinia, it quickly
suffered defeat by initial French incursions into the region. If Sardinia was going to be
stronger, the city of Genoa was the likeliest target. Genoa had surrendered to
Castlereagh’s peer William Bentinck, but only at the promise that it retain its ancient
freedoms.137 Castlereagh entertained the idea of a free Genoa and he quickly saw that
Sardinia’s need for expansion for the security of Italy against France meant the sacrifice
of Genoa.138 This decision met with disapproval in Britain, but Castlereagh supported it
in the Congress and called the Savoys back to their ancestral home in Piedmont from
their refuge in Sardinia.139 While Sardinia had been able to assist in driving France out of
Italy after Napoleon’s retreat, it could not effectively serve as a counter to French goals
on the peninsula.140 Sardinia would have to be enlarged to block easy French access, to
serve as a buffer between France and Austria, and to maintain peace in the region. At the
Congress, the promises of Bentinck to Genoa were reneged, but their sacrifice bolstered
the power of Sardinia.
Castlereagh’s overall goal in Italy was the reformation of the peninsula to resist
French military aggression. He pursued this goal through the wooing and eventual
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removal of Murat from the Kingdom of Naples, the attempt to reinstate the Bourbons as
kings of both Sicily and Naples, the extension of Austrian territories into portions of
northern Italy, and the consolidation of Sardinia with the city-state of Genoa to serve as a
buffer against France. With the rout of Napoleon from Russia and his defeat at Leipzig,
Castlereagh desired for the war to come to an end as soon as possible. While he had often
made use of Sicily as a platform for military action against France in the Mediterranean,
the defection of Murat was an opportunity that he could not pass up. Castlereagh’s
discontent grew as Murat failed to bring concerted action against his father-in-law and
stalled for greater territorial concessions. Castlereagh wanted peace and security in
southern Italy for the good of Europe and for Britain’s territorial interests, but planned
with Metternich for some possible removal of Murat should the opportunity arise.
Castlereagh was willing to forego his plan for the restoration of the Bourbons in Naples if
it meant a secure peace under Murat. On the other hand, Castlereagh’s willingness to
collude with Metternich for the long-term security of southern Italy demonstrated his
deliberate goal to make a lasting peace in Europe. His attempts to put the Bourbon’s on
the throne of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies would not have been a territorial extension
of direct French power, but would have secured the region from the Bourbons of France;
they would be unlikely to make war on a cadet house.
The extension of Austrian lands into the Mediterranean and the absorption of
Genoa were not blind aggrandizement. There was traditional Austrian authority in some
of the regions it gained control over, and this plan would carry some form of continuity
after twenty years of war. More importantly, the expansion into northern Italy would
serve as a buffer against France. The traditional holdings of the House of Savoy were
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Piedmont and the island of Sardinia. While this ancestry was enough to make a minor
power, it could not repeal French incursions for any amount of time. The history of
Sardinia as a local ruling power, unlike Austria, made it a natural center for the
sentiments of the Italian aristocracy. Bringing Sardinia’s power in line with its prestige, it
would require the city of Genoa. While Castlereagh balked at the betrayal of Genoa, he
saw the safety of Italy, the cordoning off France, and the peace of Europe as trumping all
other concerns.
The Settlement of Poland and Saxony
The borders of Central Europe were of great importance to Castlereagh in his
quest for peace. Prussia had to be strengthened against the threat of renewed French
aggression and the crossing of the Rhine—the German states bulwark—had to be
garrisoned on both banks. At the close of the Napoleonic Wars Russian forces overran
Germany and Prussian forces eyed their neighbors with greed. Castlereagh needed to
build up barricades against France, but he also needed to balance this goal against
interests in Central Europe. For his lasting peace to work, Castlereagh needed to bring his
Russia, Austrian, and Prussian allies to an equitable peace, limit Russian hegemony in
Central Europe, and protect Prussia’s neighbors from annexation. The settlements of
Poland and Saxony were one issue due to the territorial concerns of Austria, Russia, and
Prussia, and their expectations and needs for security after the Napoleonic Wars. When
Napoleon cast his eye upon the Holy Roman Empire, it was a hopelessly decentralized
system of more than 300 states. Francis of Austria turned down the position of Holy
Roman Emperor, despite the empire’s earlier prestige, for fear that it might act as an
impediment to Austria’s dealings with outside powers and lesser states within the Holy
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Roman Empire. While Napoleon had mixed contact with some of the states in Germany,
his relationship with Saxony was more cordial, at least as far as diplomatic expediency
was concerned. Saxony served as the site where the defeated Russia, Prussia, and other
lesser states paid homage to Napoleon after one of his glorious victories in Central
Europe.141
In 1808, Napoleon established the recently elevated king of Saxony, Frederick
Augustus I, as the Grand Duke of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.142 In proper gratitude,
Frederick fought on the side of Napoleon against Austria in 1809. In 1813, Frederick
received Metternich, who entreated him to turn on Napoleon, but Frederick held true for a
time. 143 However, on the eve of the Battle of Leipzig, Frederick abandoned Napoleon
and tried to defect to the Allies, causing the remnants of the Rheinbund state to collapse
around him.144 Austria and Prussia prevented Frederick’s defection and held him interned
at Schloss Friedrichsfelde.145
The issue of Saxony’s settlement made many in the Congress diplomatically
uncomfortable. While Frederick was indeed a king, the Great Powers entertained the
possibility of dethroning him and giving portions of his lands to Prussia to accommodate
them for their losses in land and souls against Napoleon.146 While the Kingdom of
Denmark lost its subsidiary state Norway, the seizure of Saxony marked the dissolution
of a Frederick’s house in Europe from a position of power. It is one thing to take away
land from a dynasty, it is quite another to dissolve its holdings altogether. However, the
Powers had different expectations in regards to Saxony. Castlereagh originally thought
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that the goals of Prussia were more modest in nature and that its territorial ambitions
were limited. As he traveled with Tsar Alexander to the conquest of Paris, his
understanding of Russian—and by extension, Prussian—ambitions in Central Europe
grew.147 Prussia desired to see itself compensated and strengthened in Northern Germany,
and it had calculated its due down to the last farmstead. Alexander hoped to strengthen a
loyal Prussian protégé. Metternich feared that giving Saxony to Prussia would increase
Austria’s borders with Prussia to a financially damaging degree, would sully Austria’s
reputation as a protector of smaller German states, and would unbalance the relationship
between Austria and Prussia to a fatal degree.148
While Metternich changed his opinions on the awarding of Saxony’s territory for
hopes of concessions on the settlement of Poland, he saw the necessity for creating a
strong state to offset the possible machinations of France to be of paramount
importance.149 Aptly enough, France’s interests were to keep Saxony separate from
Prussia so that it might be able to influence the lesser German states along its own border.
Despite this self-serving goal, Talleyrand was outspoken about the impropriety of the
Congress deposing a monarch who “governed his subjects for forty years like a father,
serving as an example of the virtues both of a man and of a prince.”150 The mixed support
and opposition to this settlement in Parliament complicated Castlereagh’s options. Not
only the British aristocracy, but the public was also uncomfortable with the idea of
unjustly removing a monarch, and Samuel Whitebread, a Member of Parliament, called
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the idea a treacherous partition, an act done in accordance with Bonaparte.151 At Vienna
itself, Castlereagh mulled over the possibility of the Allies having replaced Napoleon’s
use of arbitrary power for that of Alexander.152 While the issue of Saxony was
complicated in and of itself, it was intertwined with how the Congress dealt with the
partitioned Republic of Poland.
Castlereagh’s thoughts on Polish nationalism and self-determination
notwithstanding, he had two main goals for Poland. He wanted to settle the border in
Europe in such an equitable fashion so as to preserve peace, and he wanted to limit the
dangers of Russian hegemony or Austrian insecurity in Central Europe. The long history
of Polish partition and disintegration as an independent state posed a number of obstacles
for Castlereagh. The Kingdom of Poland was partitioned in 1772 by a supposedly
hesitant Maria Theresa in Austria, an insatiable Frederick of Prussia, and an opportunistic
Tsarina Catherine the Great.153 Despite the loss of land and political prestige, Poland
interacted with other European powers from 1788 to1791. 154 In 1793, there was a second
partition in which Russia gorged itself on eastern Poland, Prussia obtained a Polish
corridor that linked the territories of Brandenburg and Silesia, and Austria went without
benefit. This event increased the standing of Russia and Prussia, limited the benefit of
Austria’s prize in the first partition, and forced Austria to tread carefully. It feared that
Russia or Prussia would seize its holdings in Poland, a fear that limited the effectiveness
of its response to the French Revolution.155 In 1795, Russia, Austria, and Prussia divided
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Poland for a third time; again, Russia gained the most out of this situation. This benefit
was less due to the territory it took from Poland and more to the increase in power caused
by the continued rivalry and infighting between Austria and Prussia over Germany.156
While Austria feared the loss of its Polish territories, Poland itself did not fare
well throughout the tumults of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. Napoleon
attempted to rouse a rebellion in Poland during his campaign in the German states, but
with little success. Following the Treaty of Tilsit, Napoleon set up the Duchy of Warsaw
and offered it to Frederick of Saxony.157 After the defeat of Napoleon, no Power earnestly
expected Poland to become its own separate kingdom with its 1772 borders, but each
Power would discuss some change—whether it would serve to compensate Prussia for its
losses or serve as buffer state between Russia and the rest of Europe. Russia claimed the
Duchy of Warsaw by right of occupation, as compensation for its wartime efforts, and
because Warsaw’s inclusion under Russian control would better gratify the Poles. While
no one can doubt that conquest is a legitimate argument in statecraft, especially with the
200,000 Russians in the German states, the argument over compensation is particularly
demonstrative.
Russia took part in a continuation of balance of power politics and
aggrandizement through its seizure of the duchy. However, one has to take into account
what Alexander himself said on the matter.158 He promised his friend Adam Jerzy
Czatoryski, an exiled Pole, that he would rebuild Poland. Given the air of mysticism and
self-importance with which Alexander surrounded himself, it is likely that the tsar
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actively held two irreconcilable goals—that he would both govern the Poles and free
them. He would be both conqueror and savior. Though Alexander made promises to his
friend, he also had several meetings with Castlereagh on the issues of Poland and Saxony.
The tsar did plan to build a Grand Duchy of Warsaw, but Castlereagh questioned whether
this entity would be the “erection of a part of Poland into a Kingdom merged in the
Crown of Russia, [or] the restoration of the whole or greater part of it into a distinct and
independent state.” He also went on to point out the disruptive nature of a new Polish
state to the holdings of Austria and Prussia, the abhorrence of this policy in the rest of
Europe, and the burden it would lay on his own people.159 Castlereagh appealed to
Metternich and Hardenberg check the Alexander’s goals, but met with little support while
the issue of the Saxony settlement was in doubt.160 Confronted with Alexander’s stubborn
responses to Poland and Prussia’s interests in Saxony, Castlereagh began to discuss the
possibility of military action against Russian and Prussia for the preservation of balance
of power.161 Castlereagh’s goals at the Congress were not to win a silent summer for his
people, but rather to forge a lasting peace. His consideration of going to war with Russia
does not undermine his goal of peace in Europe. Castlereagh did not seek after a single
summer of quiet before war erupted once more; he sought a lasting peace in Europe. If he
had to go to war with former allies and enemies alike to achieve this peace then he was
willing to do so. His enlistment of the France in this secret pact was not a reversal of his
long-term goal of encircling France. He made use of France in the short-term while
continuing to pursue its long-term neutralization as a predatory power on the continent.
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The fate of the Polish Duchy of Warsaw mingled with the fate of Saxony.
Metternich could be convinced that Prussia deserved compensation for its losses with
lands from Saxony, or that Russia warranted rewarded for its help in the defeat of
Napoleon. However, both halves of the plan were untenable if introduced together due to
the strategic strain that it would put on Austria.162 If Russia and Prussia both realized
their prospective goals, the border they shared with Austria would be over 500 miles,
necessitating higher border security than that required to face a lesser power. According
to this plan, Russian territory would end 175 miles from Vienna.163
Castlereagh viewed the issue in terms of diplomatic relationships rather than mere
borders. He hoped for a system that set a diplomatically noncommittal Britain in the
camp of a Austria and Prussia that were against the possible growth of France and Russia.
If Prussia was building better relations with Russia and alienating Austria, then his
second plan involved a power block of Britain, France, and Austria against Russia and
Prussia.164 Castlereagh’s fears of a Russian hegemony in Europe were extreme enough
that he pursued a secret agreement with Talleyrand and Metternich in case the tsar would
not make concessions in Poland and Saxony. This secret treaty came out during the
Hundred Days, enraging the tsar, but also revealing to him the lengths that his
compatriots would go for the Central European settlement. When Castlereagh continued
to press forward in his attempt to temper Alexander’s goals in Poland, he received a letter
back from Alexander that stated that the creation of a separate Polish Kingdom would act
as a check to Russian power. Castlereagh pointed out that while a new Poland might be
legally distinct from Russia, its systematic domination by Russia would serve as an
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inroad to European politics and a stepping stone for possible military action in Central
Europe.165
Up to this point, the discussion of Castlereagh’s policies at Vienna have primarily
focused on the threat of France to the tranquility of Europe. The settlements in the
Netherlands and in Italy endeavored to strengthen them against France. The greater
freedom that Castlereagh gave Prussia in territorial claims over Russia reflects his hope
that a stronger Prussia could better contest France. Castlereagh’s settlement of Denmark
(discussed later) endeavored to recompense different states in Europe who sided against
Napoleon and weaken Denmark, who served as a long-term tool of France. Castlereagh’s
insistence on contesting Alexander’s proposal seems to be in earnest. However,
according to a discussion Castlereagh had with a lesser French diplomat,
Any attempt on the part of France to make such a collateral point as that of
Saxony a question of war, in subversion of the more important object of opposing
a barrier to Russia, must, in all probability, not only destroy the relations with
England, but lead to immediate hostilities.166
This possible alliance with France and Austria does not undermine Castlereagh’s long
term plans for peace in Europe; it merely demonstrates the lengths he would go to secure
some form of lasting peace that avoided a continental hegemony.167 France was still no
less of a danger to the peace of Europe; its power could threaten Alexander to force
terms.168
The threat of war between the Powers passed with their galvanization in the
Hundred Days, the recognition of how close they came to war, the renewed war
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weariness on the part of the statesmen, and the diplomatic prestige of Arthur Wellesley
who traveled to Vienna to take up Castlereagh’s policies while Castlereagh traveled to
London to present himself to Parliament.169 In the end, Prussia received two fifths of
Saxony with a population of about 850,000 subjects as well as the fortress of Elbe. In
exchange, Austria received Tyrol and Salzburg as well as promises for concessions in
northern Italy and Illyria.170 Frederick of Saxony kept a portion of his realm, specifically
some historically and strategically relevant settlements. The settlement was much less
than the initial claim for all of Saxony, but more than Castlereagh had hoped for.
However, Castlereagh’s stubbornness in face of Prussian desire bore fruit.171 In Poland,
Prussia kept the province of Posen, and Austria gained the province of Galicia. The
capital of Krakow and the surrounding area became a free city. The remainder of the
duchy integrated into the Kingdom of Poland under Alexander.
While price Czartoryski, Alexander’s Polish confidant, wrote the Principles of the
Constitution of the Polish Kingdom, that outlined the kingdom’s independence, he did so
with the clear understanding that the constitution was not inherent to the Polish people,
but rather a boon granted by Alexander.172 The partitioning of Poland and Saxony on its
head looks like a classic balance of power exchange of territory, and the aggrandizement
and desire for relative gains did play a part. However, the arguments Prussia made was
not that it had taken land from its neighbors by right of conquest, but that it had suffered
long against Napoleon and deserved compensation for the general security of Europe.
This claim was not just posturing on the part of Prussia. Talleyrand, Castlereagh, and
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Metternich disliked the choice of location and the distasteful treatment of Frederick of
Saxony, but they all saw the need for a strong Prussia to offset power in Northern
Germany.
Russia did gain large sections of Poland—not as direct annexation, but under the
guise of the Kingdom of Poland. While one could argue that Alexander intended to seize
Poland all along, his own words, and those of Czartoryski, protest that he had good
intentions. While the seizure of Saxony and Polish lands might have been distasteful, the
end goal was the improved security of Europe. A weakened Prussia could not offset
France or Russia, and the existence of the Polish Kingdom—even if it was under Russian
control—eased the tensions between Russia, Austria, and Prussia in that area.
If Castlereagh had a failure at the Congress of Vienna it was the negation of
Poland and Saxony. The desires of Alexander thwarted his plans for a separate Poland
asthe king of Saxony lost a good deal of territory to Prussia. However, these local
reversals did not cause irreparable damage for Castlereagh’s interests in a check on
French military expansion. While Saxony suffered, Prussia increased to a size that could
resist France. While some could argue that Russia’s inroads into Poland created the
means for it to infiltrate every continental court, it also made Russia more receptive to the
needs of Austria and Prussia. The territorial strength of Russia and its ability to draw
back politically and militarily into its own vastness failed to work with its connections to
Poland, binding it fast to Central Europe. Russia was the dominant eastern power at the
close of the Congress, but the economic and social upheaval it was undergoing did not
dissipate. The continued threat of unrest from Poland or the infiltration of Austrian or
Prussian interests turned the territory into a liability rather than a benefit. While
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Castlereagh might lament his actions in the settlement of Poland and Saxony, the buffer
state of Prussia grew stronger, and Russia’s direct interaction in Western Europe
increased.
The Settlement of Denmark
The treatment of Denmark by Castlereagh and his peers at the Congress was in
response to territorial needs and concerns, but the troubled relationship between Denmark
and Britain undoubtedly effected what diplomatic options were available to Castlereagh.
The opinions and prejudices of his peers in Britain and Denmark bound Castlereagh, but
his goal was a settlement in Europe that could ensure a lasting peace. Before the
Revolution, Russian interests in the region depended on maintaining a status quo of
conflict between Denmark and Sweden. Britain, on the other hand, focused on keeping
French authority out of the region.173 If Britain supported Sweden, it indirectly followed
that it was opposed to Denmark’s interests. After the fall of Holland to French
occupation, Denmark benefitted from the absence of its traditional trading rival. While
Danish ships did benefit France, the insistence of some in Denmark’s court to contest
Britain’s illegal searches and seizures was what caused real strife between the two
nations. The division between the two nations increased when the British sixth-rate
frigate Nemesis stopped a convoy of Danish vessels guarded by the Danish ship the
Freya. Such an affront to national honor prompted Denmark to call on Russia’s aid for
some form of action against Britain. Russia used this appeal as an excuse to call Denmark
into a League of Armed Neutrality. Some have argued that the true purpose of the League
was to serve as a check to British and Austrian interests and to serve as a conduit for
further Russian influence in Central Europe to counter a Franco-Austrian peace.
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Regardless, the British were opposed to the League as a slight to their international
prerogative and war with France. In response, Britain led a naval force and laid waste to
much of the Danish fleet to teach Denmark, and Russia by proxy, a lesson.174 Britain’s
relationship with Denmark became further complicate with the siege of Copenhagen in
1807.
The Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 secured a peace between Russia and France and
meant that there were fewer avenues through which Britain could attack France.
Castlereagh was aware of this difficulty and originally considered action in South
America and the Middle East. Eventually, he decided on an attack on Denmark to weaken
French power in Northern Europe and to deprive France of a Danish power as a possible
weapon against Britain.175 Napoleon had been eyeing the Danish fleet to supplement
France’s failures in the blue-water war with Britain. Fearing that Napoleon would bring
Denmark under his control, Castlereagh sent an expedition asking the Danes to join the
British alliance and surrender its fleet. When they refused the overture, Castlereagh sent
British forces to occupy the Danish island of Zealand, bombard Copenhagen, and destroy
the Danish fleet.176
The actions of Sweden, Denmark’s neighbor, intrinsically tied with Denmark’s
fate in the Congress of Vienna and Castlereagh’s need to negotiate for peace in Europe.
While the clash between Britain and France drew Denmark into danger between them,
Sweden drew closer to Russia’s sphere of influence. In 1811, interactions between
Sweden and Russia took the form of Russia guaranteeing support for a Swedish invasion
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of Danish Norway, and the use of Sweden as a diplomatic lifeline between the estranged
Russia and Britain.177 While the use of Denmark as an indirect channel of communication
was useful, Castlereagh disliked it. Castlereagh’s preference for direct communication
would bear fruit at Vienna and the later Congresses.178 Sweden served a similar position
as proxy for Britain’s interests in 1813 when they joined an Anglo-Swedish Alliance to
fight on the continent and take Norway from Denmark. While this policy may have
seemed necessary to combat French control of Denmark, Castlereagh never cared for
it.179 During the Napoleonic Wars, the Scandinavian states of Denmark and Sweden fell
inbetween the clashes of Britain, France, and Russia. Denmark fared poorly; the loss of
its shipping and its fleet, the bombing of Copenhagen, the loss of several islands, and the
constant threats to Norway sapped them of resources. Sweden, on the other hand,
benefitted from the patronage of Britain and Russia in turn. The connection of Denmark
to France and the more active relationship of Britain and Russia with Sweden would play
a part in their treatment in the later settlement.
Castlereagh’s goal to use Sweden as a tool against Napoleon was not always
successful. This mixed success was in part due to the confusion of the northern campaign,
but also due in large part to Jean Bernadotte’s (Charles XIV of Sweden) desire to
preserve his own troops for later use against Denmark.180 Born Jean Bernadotte in
France, this military officer became a Marshall of the Empire under Napoleon. He had
held off the British at Walcheren (interestingly enough, Castlereagh never held this
against him) and was later offered the Swedish crown. Bernadotte’s desire in the peace
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settlement rested on an agreement from 1812. If Sweden would join its forces with the
last coalition, it would receive reimbursement for territories it had lost to Russia earlier in
the Napoleonic War. This promise, along with an inability to pry Denmark away from
France while also courting Sweden, limited Castlereagh’s options. The long-term
connection between France and Denmark made any concessions towards Denmark
unpopular with the British public.181 Public opinion aside, there was a fear in Britain that
France would continue to wield great power in the Danish court even if Napoleon’s
troops were removed from garrisoned locations.182
While the Congress agreed to honor the promise made to Sweden and offer
Norway as recompense, the Norwegians had their own ideas. Norway had been under the
Danish crown for 500 years, and it did not relish the idea of transference to Sweden. In
response to the Congresses ruling, in May 1814, Norway proclaimed its independence
and crowned Prince Christian of Denmark its king. While Castlereagh was loath to take
arms against Norway for this sentiment, he agreed to the Congress’s enforcement of the
decision.183 To add further injury, Denmark never saw the lands of Northern Germany,
Swedish Pomerania, and the island of Rugen promised in recompense for the seizure of
Norway. Prussia, eager to expand territories lost in the wars and settlements of Napoleon,
coveted and received Swedish Pomerania and the island of Rugen.184
The settlement of Denmark and the reorientation of Norway to Sweden seem to
have little to do with Castlereagh’s goals for balance of power in Europe. The
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recompense of Sweden for the loss of Finland was necessary, however, to allow Russia to
keep its territories in the Northern Europe. The reorientation of Norway served four main
purposes. It kept Russia content with its seizure of Finland, which would be important in
the arguments that Castlereagh had for the preservation of Poland and Saxony. The use of
Denmark as a later tool for French aggression lessened with the loss of Norway, while at
the same time rewarding Bernadotte for his actions against Napoleon. Lastly, the removal
of Denmark’s non-continental Norway effectively increased its connection to the German
Confederation, the alliance of German states that existed for the preservation of their
individual sovereignty.185
Those who might suggest that Castlereagh had dominating conservative
motivations at the Congress ignore his support of the removal of Norway from Denmark.
The crown of Denmark had ruled Norway for more than 500 years, and its removal was a
clear break with European dynastic conservatism. He also ignored the call of the
Scandinavian peoples for some form of self-determination. While he lamented the
necessity of foisting the Swedes—unwanted—on the people of Norway, he supported
the move due to the diplomatic needs of Europe and the Congress.
Castlereagh had succeeded in bolstering the Netherlands and Piedmont-Sardinia
against France, had made peace with Russia and Prussia in the settlement of Saxony and
Poland, and had entrenched Austria in a supportive position in Italy. These goals were not
due to blind reactionary motive, but were based on a realistic need to check French
military aggression. Castlereagh’s goals were underlined with realism, but his legacy as a
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continentally-inclined reactionary endured as Britain drifted closer—against his will—to
the Holy Alliance.
During the Congress Castlereagh set aside his ideals in exchange for realism and a
belief in utilitarianism in international power politics. At the Netherlands Castlereagh
built a stronger state that could better resist France by expanding it into neighboring
territories and paying for fortresses between the two countries borders from Britain’s
coffers. In Italy Castlereagh deposed Murat, revitalized a Bourbon cadet-house in the
Two Sicilies, bolstered a stronger kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia, and tied Hapsburg
interests into the region. In Poland and Saxony Castlereagh walked a tightrope between a
need to make a lasting peace between the Powers and a need to avoid Russia achieving
hegemony in Central Europe and the strategic ruin of Austria. In Denmark he was forced
to act against the values of both European Liberalism and Conservatism in pursuit of a
territorial settlement that would pay off the allies who had assisted in the downfall of
Napoleon. Castlereagh’s diplomatic conflicts with his peers in Vienna were heated, but
the true test of his settlement was the actions of the Great Powers in the decades that
followed.
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Chapter Four
Castlereagh, the Holy Alliance, and Congressional Legacy
While Castlereagh had fought a duel before in his youth in Ireland, Canning never
fired a shot in his life. As the appointed time, approached the men readied their pistols
and took their marks. They both walked ten paces, turned, and Castlereagh and Canning
shot at one another. Both men missed their first shot. Castlereagh was not satisfied with
this outcome, and on the exchange of a second volley hit Canning in his thigh. He helped
carry Canning into the nearby house and bound up his wound. While both men went on
to deal with high policy, war, and intrigue, their duel sticks out as a singularly
demonstrative event. There are historians who have attempted to paint the lives of
Castlereagh and Canning as a great conflict between opposing ideologies. In truth,
however, the men shared the same fundamental goals of peace in Europe and prosperity
for Britain. Castlereagh’s real legacy was not the preservation of Britain’s internal
liberalism, or the checking of the Holy Alliance’s conservatism, but the preservation of
peace in Europe and the maintenance of Britain’s national interest through the system he
had arranged at the Congress of Vienna.
The Holy Alliance was the child of Alexander’s fears and insecurities after the
Napoleonic Wars. The Holy Alliance was to be a union between all of the monarchs of
Europe in a Christian accord against the forces of revolution, Jacobinism, and democracy.
Aside from these lofty goals, Alexander also desired some form of guarantee for his
newly seized territories in Poland. Metternich was eager for Austria to make use of the
arrangement in spite of his personal feelings towards the Alliance, and Prussia was
already under the influence of Russia due to strategic and personal factors. Castlereagh,
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on the other hand had two main difficulties in the support of the Holy Alliance. The
House of Hanover sat on the throne that had passed to them through the Glorious
Revolution. It would be politically absurd for a monarch who sat due to revolution to sign
a document protecting a monarch from revolution in any form.186 While this diplomatic
approval would be politically awkward, more pressing was the incompatibility of
Alexander’s autocratic dream for Europe with Britain’s constitutional monarchy. Even
more absurd was the fact that King George IV of England lacked the authority to accept
the proposal sent to him by Alexander. While the Holy Alliance was an irritant to
Castlereagh and Canning alike, the real ideological conflict between British liberalism
and continental conservatism came with the Troppau Protocol. The Holy Alliance
established the Protocol in response to the revolutions in Spain, Portugal, and Naples in
1820-1822. Russia, Austria, and Prussia formed the Protocol without the approval of
Britain and France due to their disagreements on how to address revolutions and the role
of the Quadruple Alliance in governing Europe. It stated that the Holy Alliance would
have the responsibility of guaranteeing borders and squelching revolutions throughout
Europe.187
The Troppau Protocol came out of a meeting of some of the Great Powers who
met at Troppau in 1822. It was primarily concerned with the revolutions in Spain, Italy,
Portugal, and in the Spanish Americas. Alexander, moving away from his somewhat
liberal policies in 1815, wanted the Holy Alliance to have teeth and be responsible for
putting down revolutions through the military means of the Great Powers.188 Britain
protested against such a plan, stating that it would make them “the armed guardians of all
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thrones.”189 Castlereagh disliked the Protocol for three reasons: the precariousness of a
world empires that might require the Alliance to suppress a revolution at a future date,
Britain’s historical dislike of the standing army that would be required for such a venture,
and Britain’s natural liberal tendencies. France did not support the Troppau Protocol,
either—something that was due to its attempt to improve relations with Britain, as well as
to its own more liberal political culture. Metternich made a particularly interesting
provision in the Protocol, stating that a monarch could call for outside assistance from the
other members of the Holy Alliance if their rights or sovereignty were threatened.190 This
addendum would play off quite well for Austria in the Revolution of 1848. While the
Troppau Protocol transformed the Holy Alliance into an active organization, it also
widened the ideological gap between liberal Britain and France and their autocratic
neighbors. Despite this gap, and a disagreement over the use of military force within
Europe itself, the Great Powers did not enter into general war. The Concert of Europe
endured the idiosyncrasies of its adherents.
While the Troppau Protocol gave teeth to the Holy Alliance, it did not suppress
revolutions and maintain the peace by itself. The Austrians dealt with the revolution of
Naples with audible support from the Holy Alliance.191 Against its pro-orthodox designs,
Russia did not support the Greek rebellion against the Ottoman Empire.192 France
intervened on its own, without the prompting of the Holy Alliance, moving into Spain
and giving it a resurgence of national and military prestige at little cost.193 The Polignac
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Memorandum ruled out military involvement by Britain and France.194 The continued
number and severity of revolutions in Europe and the rise of nationalism in the Balkans,
Germany, Italy, and in colonial possessions continued. These revolutions elicited ever
more severe responses from the Great Powers, but the Concert of Europe allowed general
peace to endure. The peace between the Great Powers ended when Britain and France
made war on Russia for its designs on the Straits in the Crimean War.
The argument is that Castlereagh succeeded in surrounding France with strong
states to resist French aggression. While it is readily apparent that he was instrumental in
building the larger states, how does one measure the success of his efforts? The
Netherlands, a traditional war ground in Europe, was free from invasion until the Great
War a hundred years later. Italy did not suffer invasion from France, but Sardinia did
accept the assistance of Napoleon III in the removal of Austrians from settlements in
northern Italy. Denmark, Norway, and Sweden slipped into relative unimportance in the
larger affairs of Europe. In the decades after the Congress of Vienna, French soldiers
returned to Italy and Spain, would travel across the Atlantic, and would finally fight
beneath the walls of Sevastopol. Yet, none of these conflicts were for the purpose of
conquest. Though the restored Bourbons and Napoleon III fought and schemed to push
French prestige around the world and to use their influence for greater power in Europe,
the end goal of their ventures was not to seize estates, goods, and material for an ever
greater war on Europe, but rather for discreet diplomatic goals. Castlereagh’s desire to
surround France tied with the “guarantee,” the international recognition of borders and
the rights of states. It is clear that Castlereagh surrounded France with stronger states, but
what is not clear is if these new states were guarded by a bayonet in hand or by the lines
194
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on a map. Castlereagh’s reputation among his peers did not celebrate the lasting general
peace that he gave Britain for decades but instead abjured him for entangling Britain in
continental conflict.
Castlereagh was a man of his times. He was not a Prince Metternich who led the
post-Conference Europe about with relative ease, he was not Tsar Alexander with a holy
mission of import. He of course had his own personal ideologies and opinions. He acted
foolishly on an international stage in the attack at Walcheren and even more absurdly in
his private duel with Canning. In spite of these faults, his long-term goals were not
overawed by emotion and ideology but where the fruit of his experiences. The revolt in
Ireland and what he had seen in France and Spa, led Castlereagh to distrust what he saw
as the intemperate and disruptive nature of the Revolution. He advocated sorties into
Napoleonic France and brought the Allies together in the last coalition. While the Treaty
of Paris succeeded in securing Britain’s immediate territorial concerns, Castlereagh took
the negotiations to Vienna with the intent of securing a lasting peace in Europe and a
bulwark against French aggression. He supported the strengthening of the Netherlands
and Piedmont-Sardinia; reestablished stable dynasties in Italy; and resettled Saxony,
Poland, and Denmark to secure a peace with the other Great Powers. While he made
decisions that glossed over the needs and desires of voiceless peoples in disputed
territories, his goal was never the reestablishment of autocratic control, but the security of
Europe and a lasting peace. Castlereagh’s endeavors at Vienna and his attention to
political realism secured a peace for Europe that lasted until the Crimean War and
tempered the upheaval of the continent until the Great War.
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